

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 June 1969 (RCS/CSFOR-65) (UGC - WDFZEO) (U)

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RECOMMENDATION: All detainees regardless of age, sex or papers should be evacuated for questioning by IPW teams.

e. Evacuation Channels for "Innocent Civilians"

OBSERVATION: Local authorities are the most reliable identifiers of VCI.

EVALUATION: Not all VC can be identified by IPW questioning techniques. The higher level infrastructure personnel especially are of high intelligence and usually have a well rehearsed cover story and legitimate identification papers.

RECOMMENDATIONS: All detainees classified as civilian should be returned to the local authorities in the area of capture. Many VCI have been identified at the local level by face to face contact with police and GVN authorities.

f. Evaluation of Red Haze Missions

OBSERVATION: Red Haze (RH) may give false indications of enemy presence.

EVALUATION: Red Haze sensors have been known to record heat returns from burning and smoldering rice stacks and field rubble. During the dry season in the Delta, there is considerable intentional burning of fields for agricultural purposes and grass fires in the Plain of Reeds are continuous. The smoldering area left after a burn off produces an image much like camp fires. Also during the rainy season many Vietnamese farmers burn smudge fires in and around their dwellings to drive off mosquitoes. The most reliable indications are those on canals indicating motorized sarpan movement.

RECOMMENDATION: Past experience has revealed that all heat returns on a RH mission are not necessarily of military significance. Imagery interpreters should consider this possibility when interpreting RH missions.

g. Aerial Photography Requirements

ITEM: Use of aerial photography in combat operations has not been adequate for quick reaction target.

EVALUATION: Due to the short time reaction of combat operations to intelligence, normal Air Force coverage has not proved timely and in many cases gives inadequate coverage of a particular area. The hand-held camera program available through MIB/R assets has proved very valuable for giving the ground commander a real time study of terrain and fortifications in a particular area.

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RECOMMENDATION: That more facilities be established for the faster, more exploitable, hand held camera photo coverage.

h. Ground Intrusion Detectors (Duffel Bag)

OBSERVATION: Ground Intrusion Detectors were effectively employed to assist in target acquisition, early warning, and force conservation.

EVALUATION: Successful planning and installation of sensor fields permitted the Brigade to monitor selected areas for enemy movement. These sensor fields were used in conjunction with other intelligence for acquisition of artillery and air mobile targets. Troop units were employed 600 meters or more from sensor fields, using the field as an early warning device and permitting artillery fire to engage the field area. This method enabled the ground troops to react rapidly or prepare to ambush enemy moving in their direction. Sensor fields were also used as an aid to troop conservation by employment on known base areas, LOC's, and infiltration routes eliminating the need for troop operations to monitor enemy movement. In most cases of activation, VC artillery was fired on the field location. Unfortunately on some occasions quick fuze artillery and 2.75 rockets have been fired on the fields thereby destroying the equipment.

RECOMMENDATION: Maximum employment of the Ground Intrusion Detectors for more beneficial surveillance coverage of desired areas is recommended.

i. Stay Behind Ambush

OBSERVATION: The stay behind ambush has proved very effective in gaining contact.

EVALUATION: The VC have developed the tactic of moving into the areas which have been swept by US forces believing that there will usually not be further operations in the area for a number of days. Small elements left behind when the main force is extracted have been very successful in obtaining body count, when clandestinely employed. Bushmaster and checkerboard operations have been unsuccessful because of the highly effective VC "grapevine" communications system.

RECOMMENDATION: Continue to develop and refine this technique for further exploitation.

j. Night Search Operations

OBSERVATION: The use of night search operations has reached a point of diminishing returns in Dinh Tuong Province.

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EVALUATION: The enemy has adapted his night movement tactics to cease movement and take available cover at the sound of any helicopter, making him virtually undetectable by night observation device from aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: Substitute the night raid for the night search technique using ground troops to search out known or suspected LCC's, base camps, radar sightings and ground sensor activations.

1. Agent Nets

CONCLUSION: US Operated Intelligence Agent Networks have been determined to be unreliable and possibly part of a VC Deception Operation.

EVALUATION: US Operated Agent Networks in Dinh Thong Province gain most of their information through elicitation. The Rural areas of the Province are mostly populated with VC dependents, sympathizers, infrastructure, intelligence agents and guerrillas. When a subagent elicits information from those people, they usually receive what information the VC want them to have. US Nets were required to meet a prescribed number of agent reports per month. This prevented selectivity and upgrading of reliable sources due to the requirement to expand networks to meet production standards. Agent handlers were not able to properly analyze and evaluate reports due to the volume.

During the months of November 68 through January 69, these agents continued to report Main Force Units throughout the TAOI. From 14 November 68 until 30 June 69, no significant contact was made based on these agent reports. Captured documents, contacts, POW's, rallies, and reliable intelligence confirmed that many of the units, (continually reported by agents) had been absent from the Province prior to February 69. The continual reporting prevented detection, by agent reports, when the Main Forces return to the TAOI prior to the Post Tet (23 Feb 69, winter spring) offensive. Lack of contact with some of these units since early April indicates that these units have again left the TAOI. A known communist method of counter intelligence is to lead the friendly forces to believe that the enemy is where he isn't. Through three Third Party Induced Ho Chi Chans, who were determined to be VC agents attempting to infiltrate friendly units as Mit Carson Scouts, it was learned that the US handled agent who induced them was a VC Intelligence agent.

RECOMMENDATION: That a thorough area study be made prior to determining what type reports will be acceptable. Elicitation works well in some parts of Vietnam, however, in an area largely controlled by the VC and in which the population is sympathetic to or in fear of the VC, penetration and infiltration agents provide the most reliable intelligence. This type agent net requires more

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planning and more time to establish but is considered worth the effort. Intelligence agents should be required to provide intelligence only. Additional requirements such as the Third Party Inducement Program endanger the agent, reduce agent's effort to produce intelligence, and increase the probability of falsified reports. Agent handlers must be permitted to concentrate on obtaining reliable reports through developing good agents. No volume requirement should ever be imposed on agent networks. A few delayed or "untimely" reports, gained through personal clandestine observation, are much more valid than reports gained by asking a fisherman if he has seen any VC. To be effective, agent handlers should keep abreast of the tactical situation and maintain records of other intelligence gathering sources in order to adequately evaluate their agents. An agent report of 200 VC passing through an area, covered by overlapping ground radar fans, SLAR, friendly ambush positions, 3 NP/FF outposts, and 3 ground intrusion detector fields, without detection is reasonably doubtful.

3. (U) TRAINING: N/A
4. (U) INTELLIGENCE: N/A
5. (U) LOGISTIC: N/A
6. (U) ORGANIZATION: N/A
7. (U) OTHER: N/A

SECTION III

Lessons Learned from Employment of Tactical Cover and Deception

Enemy Deceit and Deception Techniques: N/A

JOHN G. HAYES
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

1. (C) Organic/Assigned Units:
 - a. HHC, 1st Acd
 - b. 2nd Bn 39th Inf
 - c. 3rd Bn 39th Inf
 - d. 4th Bn 39th Inf
 - e. 6th Bn 31st Inf
2. (C) Direct Support Units:
 - a. 1st Bn 11th Arty
 - b. Co A, 15th Engr Bn
 - c. Co A, 9th Med Bn
 - d. Co C, 709th Maint Bn
 - e. 6th Plat, 9th MP Co
 - f. 1st Plat, 335 HRC
3. (U) Attached Units: N/A
4. (C) Units Occasionally under Operational Control:
 - a. B Troop, 3/17 Cav
 - b. A Troop, 7/1
 - c. C Troop, 7/1
 - d. D Troop, 3/5

Inclosure 1

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DOD DIR 5800.10

AVDE-DA-T

SUBJECT: Operational Report
65) (UIC - WDFZTO) (U)

30 June 1969

(RCS/GSFCR-

ROSTER OF NEW PERSONNEL

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BRIGADE

| | |
|--------------------------|---|
| COL JOHN G. HAYES | CO |
| LTC LE ROY W. DEBENT JR. | XO, Replaced LTC GERALD J. CARLSON 3 Jun 69 |
| CPT JOHN J. TAPLEY | S1, Replaced MAJ WILLIAM T. HUEFNER, 16 May 69 |
| MAJ ALVIN B. MORRIS | S2 |
| MAJ JACK L. HARRIS | S3, Replaced MAJ JAMES A. MUSSELIAN, 15 Jun 69 |
| MAJ LEROY H. STOLIEF | S4, Replaced MAJ ROBERT D. YEAROUT, 5 Jun 69 |
| MAJ LEWIS HIGDON OTMAN | S5 |
| CPT WAYNE E. SKYDER | HHC CO, Replaced CPT JESSE L. JOHNSON, 8 May 69 |

HEADQUARTERS 2ND BATTALION 3RD INFANTRY

| | |
|------------------------|--|
| LTC ROBERT A. SULLIVAN | CO |
| MAJ VALENTINE KIGER | XO, Replaced MAJ JAMES R. TAYLOR, 24 May 69 |
| LT STEPHEN KEEFER | S1 |
| CPT THOMAS H. DORSETT | S2, Replaced CPT VINCENT W. HARTMANN, 8 May 69 |
| CPT WILLIAM MCILLIAN | S3, Replaced MAJ JOHN D. FURDY, 18 May 69 |
| CPT GARY A. KEEVERT | S4, Replaced MAJ LEROY SUTLIEF, 18 May 69 |
| LT FRANK KORTE | S5, Replaced LT LEONARD SPRINKLES, 30 Jun 69 |
| LT TONY MCILLIAN | HHC CO |
| CPT DONALD DONAY | A Co CO, Replaced CPT SHERMAN WILLIFORD, 22 May 69 |
| CPT CHARLES GALLAHER | B Co CO, Replaced CPT THOMAS H. DORSETT, 8 May 69 |
| CPT VINCENT HARTMANN | C Co CO, Replaced CPT O. T. SPRIGGS, 18 May 69 |
| LT WILLIAM A. RANDALL | D Co CO |
| LT BILL HINDERER | E Co CO |

HEADQUARTERS 3RD BATTALION 39TH INFANTRY

| | |
|-----------------------|---|
| LTC JOHN D. SKYTHE | CO |
| MAJ WILLIAM J. LEHN | XO |
| LT JOHN F. BERG | S1 |
| LT RICHARD SISLAK | S2 |
| MAJ JOHN C. MCCORMACK | S3, Replaced MAJ ROBERT BURKE, 26 May 69 |
| CPT DONALD RIFFER | S4, Replaced CPT RICHARD CLAYBAUGH, 26 Jun 69 |
| LT ROBERT ROBINLARD | S5, Replaced CPT THOMAS H. SAYES, 26 Jun 69 |
| CPT WILLIAM B. MCENRY | HHC CO |
| CPT ALFRED ROBERTS | A Co CO, Replaced 1LT SETN COLLINS, 22 May 69 |
| CPT LLOYD WOOLVERTON | B Co CO |
| CPT DAVID BARTY | C Co CO, Replaced LT PETER DALRY, 2 Jun 69 |

Inclosure 2

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30 June 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 June 1969 (ACS/CSFOR-65) (UIC - WDFZTO) (U)

CPT JAMES ROBINSON D Co CO
CPT JOSEPH H. EGGD E Co CO

HEADQUARTERS 4TH BATTALION 38TH INFANTRY


MAJ JAMES R. TAYLOR CO, Replaced LTC DAVID H. HACKWORTH
MAJ ROBERT HILCHEN XO
LT CARY ELLIS S1, Replaced LT DAVID M. KISLER 30 Jun 69
LT GORDON C. BOONGARD S2, Replaced CPT LAYTON C. KATT 4 May 69
CPT GORDON D. DERGOS S3, Replaced MAJ GEORGE F. MORGAN 12 Jun 69
CPT MORIO YAMAHASHI S4
CPT ROBERT C. HAY S5
CPT FRED C. DEUSCA HHC CO, Replaced LT ROBERT L. JOHNSON 9 May 69
1LT EVERETT BEATON A Co CO, Replaced CPT TRENT N. THOMAS 30 Jun 69
CPT JAMES H. MUKOYAMA B Co CO, Replaced LT CHESTER HARGUS 12 Jun 69
CPT DONALD R. MEYER C Co CO, Replaced LT RAY FLETCHER 10 May 69
CPT EDWARD W. CLARK III D Co CO
1LT LAWRENCE TABLER E Co CO

HEADQUARTERS 6TH BATTALION 31ST INFANTRY

LTC GERALD J. CARLSON CO, Replaced LTC RALPH J. PETERSON 30 Apr 69
MAJ JOHN J. MCGINN XO, Replaced MAJ CARLOS MERCADO 30 Jun 69
LT ALFRED P. LEMERA S1, Replaced LT WILLIAM W. KLINGLER 24 Jun 69
CPT ROBERT D. ROBBINS S2
MAJ STEVEN FERRI S3, Replaced MAJ JOHN J. MCGINN 30 Jun 69
CPT JACK R. ZAMUDIO S4
LT PETER ROBY S5, Replaced CPT JAMES D. QUISBERT 30 Jun 69
CPT JOHN D. WALKER HHC CO, Replaced CPT NEOLIO MONTERO 3 Jun 69
CPT JOHN C. RICKER B Co CO
CPT ALEXANDER NICOLINI A Co CO, Replaced CPT LEBERT 20 May 69
CPT RANDALL B. NEEDLOCK C Co CO, Replaced CPT GEORGE R. MAULDIN 17 Jun 69
LT THOMAS C. SLIVING D Co CO
CPT MALCOLM R. VASS E Co CO

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


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


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
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Inclosure 5

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarter Ending 30 June 1969 (U)

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HEADQUARTERS

2ND BRIGADE

9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

OPERATIONAL REPORT

FOR PERIOD ENDING

30 JUNE 1989

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2ND BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96372

AVDE-BB-T

11 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division for Period
Ending 30 June 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

THRU: Commanding General
9th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDE-MH
APO 96370

TO: ACSFOR
Dept of the Army
Washington, DC 20310

Reference: AR 525-15, dated 26 January 1968

SECTION I

Operations: Significant Activities

I. (C) Introduction:

a. As part of the Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force, the 2nd Brigade River Raiders continued operations at a high tempo during the last two months of operations. Constant pressure applied by the Brigade denied the enemy the use of base camps and safe areas, and the opportunity to reorganize and redistribute personnel and supplies to his severely battered units in Kien Hoa Province and adjacent districts in Go Cong and Vinh Binh Provinces. These strike operations also seriously interdicted, his infiltration and exfiltration routes.

b. Combined, or at minimum coordinated, operations with Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units increased significantly in number and in effectiveness of execution. US support assets, including assault helicopter lifts, air cavalry, and artillery, were made available to RF/PF units to enhance their potential in combined operations.

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Ending 30 June 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

c. The brigade participated in two significant combat engagements. Except for these two encounters, contacts with enemy forces remained limited to small elements of local force battalions and companies, and to groups of guerrillas. As during the last quarter, decisive contact was avoided by the enemy. For a very short period during late May, the enemy has showed indications of a willingness to make a stand rather than withdraw and avoid decisive contact, but this proved a short lived trend.

2. (C) Organization: The 2nd Brigade organization for combat remained unchanged. Naval elements of the MRF were reduced, but continued to provide adequate lift and support for two battalions and their associated combat support.

3. (C) Personnel and Administration:

a. Personnel:

(1) Unit Strength: The average assigned strength of major subordinate units during the period 1 May 1969 through 30 June 1969 was:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>OFF</u> | <u>EM</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|------------------|------------|-----------|--------------|
| HHC, 2nd Bde | 39 | 194 | 233 |
| 3rd Bn, 47th Inf | 35 | 744 | 779 |
| 4th Bn, 47th Inf | 33 | 746 | 779 |
| 3rd Bn, 60th Inf | 35 | 685 | 720 |

(2) Maneuver battalions maintained the combat available strength of their companies at 75% of authorized strength throughout most of the period. The most serious degradation of field strength resulted from dermatological problems related to foot diseases, principally immersion foot.

(3) Continued emphasis was placed on reclassification of individuals in 11 series MOS with permanent or recurring temporary profiles to permit their transfer, thus creating vacancies for unrestricted duty personnel.

(4) The following changes occurred in key positions:

(a) CPT Robert J. Busch assumed the duties of S5, 2nd Bde from 1LT Jeffrey E. Thorpe on 10 May 1969.

(b) LTC Bruce F. Williams assumed command of the 3rd Battalion, 47th Infantry from LTC I. Pack on 15 May 1969.

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(c) CPT Joseph A. Di Eduardo assumed the duties of S3, 2nd Brigade from MAJ John W. Gaglioti on 24 May 1969.

(d) CPT Clyde E. Jacks Jr. assumed the duties of S1, 2nd Brigade from MAJ Thomas G. Hendrick on 9 June 1969.

(5) Friendly casualties as a result of hostile action were:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>MONTH</u> | <u>KIA</u> | <u>WIA</u> |
|------------------|--------------|------------|------------|
| 3rd Bn, 47th Inf | May 69 | 3 | 48 |
| | Jun 69 | 8 | 80 |
| | Total | 11 | 128 |
| 4th Bn, 47th Inf | May 69 | 4 | 56 |
| | Jun 69 | 4 | 43 |
| | Total | 8 | 99 |
| 3rd Bn, 60th Inf | May 69 | 14 | 62 |
| | Jun 69 | 4 | 43 |
| | Total | 18 | 105 |

b. Administration:

(1) Awards and Decorations: The awards and decorations program within the brigade continued to receive maximum command attention. Noteworthy was the submission of the Congressional Medal of Honor for SP4 Bruce Lang, 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry.

4. (C) Intelligence:

a. 2nd Brigade operations inflicted heavy losses on enemy local force and guerrilla units. These losses kept the enemy off balance and negated his ability to launch major offensive operations. To compensate for this loss of initiative, the enemy reverted to harassing and terrorist tactics directed primarily against population centers and revolutionary development areas.

(1) The enemy effort to strengthen his forces failed due to continuous friendly operations in enemy controlled areas; and by the protection afforded to the rural population by these operations. Replacement of cadre personnel was not accomplished.

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(2) Local force battalions and companies attempted to avoid contact with US forces whenever possible. Only during late April and mid-May did fragmented enemy units mass into company sized units. This massing of forces was accomplished to launch a new offensive timed to coincide with International Labor Day and Ho Chi Minh's birthday. The offensive did not materialize. Contacts by 2nd Brigade elements with elements of the 580th Local Force Battalion and the 516th Local Force Battalion in April and May, inflicted heavy casualties on these units and precluded against enemy offensive operations.

(3) Enemy initiated incidents were aimed primarily at population centers and outlying areas. During May incidents increased in conjunction with the launching of a new VC offensive. Province and district towns were mortared, RF/PF outposts were harassed, and roads were mined.

(4) Increased use was made of night surveillance and detection equipment. Radar and DUFFEL BAG sensors were emplaced along known enemy routes to halt movement during the period of darkness.

(5) Collection emphasis was placed on the rapid exploitation of information gained from Chieu Hoi, PWs, and captured documents. In June a Chieu Hoi led elements of the 3rd Battalion 47th Infantry and a National Police Field Force (NPF) platoon to a large weapons cache consisting of 10 crew served weapons, 31 individual weapons, and large amounts of ammunition and explosives.

(6) Enemy weaknesses and vulnerabilities as indicated by PW's, Chieu Hoi, and other intelligence sources are.

(a) Enemy morale continues to decline due to US operations, artillery fire, helicopter gunships, and airstrikes.

(b) The loss of personnel, particularly cadre and the lack of VC dominated areas had left the enemy hard pressed to recruit and train replacements.

5. (C) Combat Operations:

a. The River Raiders continued to use Reconnaissance in Force (RIF) as its primary combat operational technique. Cordon and search operations and raids were continued with VC/NLF infrastructure the major target. These operations were conducted in close cooperation, and whenever possible, as combined operations with provincial forces.

b. Night operations continued to receive major emphasis. Night ambushes, night patrols, night search, and Aquasnipe operations were increased in scope and tempo and conducted on a regular basis. The enemy, however, displayed an improved capability to counter these techniques and only forty percent of the brigade enemy kills were the result of night operations.

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c. The effective use and employment of snipers organic to each of the maneuver battalions reinforced the potential and increased the night-kill ratio of night combat operations.

d. The Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) and 2nd Brigade continued to conduct watermobile, airmobile, and footmobile operations predominantly in Kien Hoa Province with emphasis in Giong Trom, Truc Giang, Ham Long, Mo Cay, and Don Nhon Districts.

e. Units participating in brigade operations were HHC 2nd Brigade, 3rd Battalion 47th Infantry, 4th Battalion 47th Infantry, 3rd Battalion 60th Infantry, 3rd Battalion 34th Artillery, D Troop 3rd Squadron 5th Cavalry, Co D 15th Engineer Battalion, 162 Assault Helicopter Company, and 1097 Transport Company (Medium Boat), and Task Group 117, United States Navy.

f. Summary of Enemy Losses:

| <u>KIA</u> | <u>PW</u> | <u>CD</u> | <u>DET</u> | <u>HC</u> | <u>IND WPN</u> | <u>CS WPN</u> |
|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|----------------|---------------|
| 1565 | 77 | 159 | 335 | 49 | 140 | 16 |

g. Summary of Friendly Losses:

| <u>US KIA</u> | <u>US WIA</u> |
|---------------|---------------|
| 37 | 332 |

h. Combat Support Activities:

(1) Artillery: The 3rd Battalion, 34th Artillery continued to provide support to MRF combat operations.

(2) Army Aviation: From the period 1 May 1969 - 30 June 1969, the units of the 2nd Brigade conducted 144 company sized airmobile operations.

(3) Tactical Air Support: Preplanned and immediate airstrikes continued to be provided by the 7th USAF during the reporting period.

(4) Naval Fire Support: The Navy River Divisions continued to provide direct and indirect fire support for water movements. Organic weapons of River Assault Flotilla One were used extensively to engaged targets sighted by radar and DUFFEL BAG sensors.

i. Tactics and Techniques:

(1) Tactics and Techniques employed by the River Raiders basically did not change. The focus of effort was on establishing and holding contact with

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Ending 30 June 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

the enemy by aggressive thrusts deep into his base areas.

(2) The efficiency of force employment was also enhanced by resisting the tendency to over-react. A rapid assessment of enemy capabilities followed by insertion of only the minimum force necessary to meet and successfully engage him conserved US human assets and produced a VC kill rate higher than that which normally attained when the presence of excessive friendly units inhibited the application of adequate supporting fires.

6. (C) Training: Individual and unit training continued to be conducted to meet combat operational requirements.

7. (C) Logistics:

a. The system of resupply utilizing the support LST of the Mobile Riverine Base and the 9th Infantry Division logistical base at Dong Tam continued. On 14 June 1969 alert notification to redeploy to CONUS was received. Logistical operations were scaled down to meet the lessened demands of subordinate units. Immediate action was initiated to turn-in equipment. As of 29 June 1969 the 3rd Battalion 60th Infantry completed their equipment turn-in. No major difficulties were encountered.

b. Material and Services:

(1) Class I: There was a decrease in this class of supply. Over 287,000 meals (Combat, Individual and LRRP) were issued from the support LST. In addition, over 270 tons of Class I were required for the brigade headquarters field mess and the 3rd Battalion 47th Infantry. These figures do not include rations grown and served by the Navy messes aboard ship.

(2) Class II: There was a decrease in this class of supply. An estimated 30 tons of Class II was utilized.

(3) Class III: An estimated 400 tons of Class III was required by the brigade.

(4) Class IV: There was a sharp decrease in the requirements of Class IV materials. An estimated 90 tons was issued for the improvement of the Brigade Forward C.P. at Ben Tre, 3rd Battalion 47th Infantry base camp, and a new 4.2in mortar site for 4th Battalion 47th Infantry.

(5) Class V: There was a marked increase in the requirement of Class V materials. Over 760 tons of Class V were issued as compared to 350 tons during the last quarter.

(6) Class VII: Certain shortages of equipment continued to exist, included Antenna RC-292; Mortar, 4.2 inch.

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(7) Class VIII: No shortages existed.

(8) Class IX: The shortage of repair parts was alleviated to some extent. A FORSTAT rating of C1 was obtained in the area of P1L for the Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company.

(9) Transportation: The lack of organic wheel transportation continued to be a problem. Vehicle damage by accidents and by encounters with land mines forced increased reliance upon division assets.

(a) Truck - 259 sorties (Does not include troop hauls within Dong Tam area).

(b) CH-47 - 270 sorties

(c) UH-1 - 350 sorties

(d) CH-54A - 5 sorties

(e) LCM-8 - 10 sorties

8. (C) Civic Action:

a. The Military Civic Action Program (MILCAP) continued at an intensified pace throughout the western and central districts of Kien Hoa Province. The Brigade conducted 315 MEDCAPs, 335 ICAPs, 85 NITECAPs, and 18 DENTCAPs. 33,589 patients were treated.

b. Civic Action projects varied from providing repairs and additions to two schools in Ham Long and two schools in Truc Giang, to conducting a training program for Vietnamese medics, midwives, and dentists. Among the more significant provisions were school desks and benches for the schools in Giong Trom and orphanages in Ben Tre, playground equipment for the orphanages, telephone poles for the installation of electricity to the Buddhist orphanage in Ben Tre; and a bi-weekly clinic for the Catholic orphanage in Ben Tre. Water systems were constructed and repaired for selected villages throughout Kien Hoa Province.

9. (C) Psychological Operations: The brigade conducted 286 Air loudspeaker missions and disseminated 10,075,000 leaflets with "Chieu Hoi" and "Support the GVN" themes. Ground loudspeaker and ground leaflet dissemination accounted for 377 missions accomplished through the MILCAP program.

10. (C) Chemical: Chemical operations remained unchanged.

11. (C) Signal: Communications systems for the Brigade remained unchanged.

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~~SECTION III~~

Lessons Learned:

1. (C) Personnel and Administration: Casualty Reporting

OBSERVATION: Minor casualties, not requiring medical evacuation, are oftentimes not expeditiously reported to higher headquarters.

EVALUATION: Minor casualties, those sustained in combat and not requiring treatment in the field, or requiring only minor field treatment are often not reported to higher headquarters until after the unit returns from its operations, and are then reported by unit medical facilities only as the basis for Purple Heart qualification. Late reports are submitted to brigade and division headquarters anywhere from two to five days after the incident.

RECOMMENDATION: To insure that casualty figures of all units, to include company, battalion, brigade, and division, are the same, commanders at the lowest levels should report all casualties to higher headquarters, no matter how slight the wound.

2. (C) Operations:

a. Tactical Cover and Deception

OBSERVATION: The enemy is able to observe and estimate the size of a US Force as it enters a given area using watermobile assets.

EVALUATION: Any given size assault force requires a certain number of Armored Troop Carriers (ATC) and escorting boats. For example, a rifle company of three platoons is generally inserted using three ATC.

RECOMMENDATION: That the number of boats used remain constant even when the assaulting force is smaller than a full company. If a two-platoon insertion is to be made, three ATCs should be used and beached as if they were carrying troops.

OBSERVATION: Immediate watermobile/airmobile reinsertion at or near an extraction site achieves tactical surprise.

EVALUATION: Repeated use of this technique, and variations of it, were found productive in establishing contact with an enemy who generally avoided contact. A unit watermobile extracted at a given site was reinserted 1-2km from the extraction site, sometimes on the opposite bank. A fresh rifle company was airmobile inserted where another company had just extracted. Ranger hunter-killer teams were inserted using helicopters which extracted rifle company troops. A late afternoon lift of helicopters or boats indicates to the enemy that US Forces are leaving the area. Reinsertion catches them unprepared and increases the opportunity for contact.

Lessons Learned:

RECOMMENDATION: Increased use of the foregoing techniques.

b. Decreased Levels of tactical Operations:

OBSERVATION: As 2nd Brigade units stood down in preparation for redeployment, the Brigade TAOI was covered adequately with available forces using airmobile assets and the techniques of multiple platoon-size insertions to locate the enemy and establish contact.

EVALUATION: A given area could be covered with decreasing troop assets by using fully the assault lift provided by the 162 Assault Helicopter Company. Multiple insertions over a wide area of suspected enemy locations increased the probability of contact without decreasing effective combat power. Once contact was gained, reinforcing elements could be rapidly deployed at decisive points productively, instead of spending time searching for the enemy.

RECOMMENDATION: That the technique of multiple platoon-size airmobile insertions over a broad area of likely targets be employed.

3. (U) Organization and Training: Command Posts

OBSERVATION: The 2nd Brigade operated with two battalions based aboard Mobile Riverine Base ships and one battalion land-based in Kien Hoa Province. A Joint Tactical operations center (Army-Navy), heavy in operations personnel, operated aboard the USS BENEWAH. A second Tactical Operations Center heavy in intelligence personnel operated at Ben Tre.

EVALUATION: Two full-time command posts provided the Brigade Commander effective command, control, and communications generally near any significant contact, regardless of adverse weather conditions encountered during the monsoon season, and without significant increase in personnel requirements. The focus of intelligence effort was at the most effective source of such information, the Sector TOC, while planning and operational coordination were accomplished readily in the JTOC.

RECOMMENDATION: That multiple command posts be considered a valid concept where conditions (weather, dispersion, area of operations) make them advisable.

4. (U) Intelligence: None.

5. (U) Logistics:

a. Equipment Losses - Medical Evacuation.

OBSERVATION: Equipment evacuated with medically evacuated personnel was lost.

EVALUATION: In most instances the equipment of medically evacuated personnel is evacuated with the individual. A lack of proper accountability for this

Lessons Learned:

equipment at the hospital resulted in unnecessary paperwork. Each unit attempted to pick up evacuated equipment but found that the equipment had already disappeared prior to the units representatives arrival at the hospital.

RECOMMENDATION: That more stringent accountability procedures be employed at the hospital to insure that evacuated equipment is immediately identified with the evacuated individual and that this equipment be turned over to authorized personnel only.

b. Medical Evacuation

OBSERVATION: Aerial Medical Evacuation remained one of the least reliable and responsive means of support.

EVALUATION: Location and availability of "Dustoff" aircraft resulted, even in urgent cases, in a consistently unacceptable long time in MEDEVAC response. Delays up to an hour, where only a ten minute flight time was involved, were the norm. This imposed unnecessary suffering on the wounded, and degraded confidence on the part of these combat soldiers in the reliability of medical evacuation. As a consequence, increased reliance was necessary on unit command and control aircraft, and on air cavalry and airmobile unit aircraft which accomplished the majority of dustoffs at the expense of their normal critical missions. In one case, MEDEVAC aircraft, called to evacuate one urgent and two priority wounded, refused to evacuate the priority cases because the urgent case had died, even though a twenty minute one-way flight was required. The priority cases were then evacuated by other means. In another instance, after waiting for Dustoff of an urgent case beyond normal times, the brigade C&C was used to accomplish evacuation to 3rd Surgical Hospital. On landing at the hospital pad, the MEDEVAC crew was observed walking to their aircraft for the mission. Over thirty minutes had elapsed since Dustoff had been requested. The foregoing are cited as examples of poor medical administration and are not intended to detract from the exceptional personal bravery and dedication regularly demonstrated by many individual "Dustoff" pilots.

RECOMMENDATION: Strong efforts to improve the timeliness of Dustoff response.

6. (U) Communications: Frequency Interference.

OBSERVATION: Considerable frequency interference has occurred in the high frequency band of the AN/WRC-46. It was noted that the interference occurred more frequently when switching from secure voice to normal operation.

EVALUATION: When operating the radio set in the non-secure mode, the X-mode/normal switch must be in the normal position.

RECOMMENDATION: To determine the switch positions, place the squelch in the

Lessons Learned:

new off position and remove the retaining cap from the X-mode cable connector.
If rushing noise does not occur, the radio set is in X-mode condition.

2 Incl

1. Organizational Structure
2. Key Personnel



R. C. RAINVILLE
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

HEADQUARTERS 2ND BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

1. (C) Organic/Assigned Units:
 - a. HHC 2nd Brigade
 - b. 3rd Battalion 47th Infantry
 - c. 4th Battalion 47th Infantry
 - d. 3rd Battalion 60th Infantry
2. (C) Attached Units:
 - a. Three Teams, Company E, 75th Infantry (Long Range Patrol)
 - b. 2nd Support Platoon, 335th Radio Research Company
 - c. Team, 10th Battalion 4th PSYOPS Group
3. (C) Direct Support Units:
 - a. 3rd Battalion 34th Artillery
 - b. Company D, 15th Engineer Battalion
 - c. Detachment, Company B, 9th Signal Battalion
 - d. Clearing Platoon Company D, 9th Medical Battalion
 - e. Detachment, Company A, 9th Supply and Transportation Battalion
 - f. Detachment, Company E, 709th Maintenance Battalion
 - g. Detachment, 9th Military Intelligence Company
 - h. Detachment, 2nd Platoon, 9th Military Police Company
 - i. Team, Finance Section, 9th Infantry Division
 - j. Postal Team, Adjutant General Section, 9th Infantry Division
 - k. Team, 10th Public Information Detachment

Incl 1


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KEY PERSONNEL

HEADQUARTERS 2ND BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

| <u>POSITION</u> | <u>NAME, GRADE, BRANCH, ASN</u> |
|--------------------|--|
| Commanding Officer | R.C. RAINVILLE COL, INF 069546 |
| Executive Officer | RICHARD D. MOORE LTC, AR 066220 |
| S1 | CLYDE E. JACKS JR CPT, INF 05334564 |
| S2 | FREDERICK E. BRAZEE CPT, INF OF108122 |
| S3 | JOSEPH A. DI EDUARDO CPT, INF OF103820 |
| S4 | DEAN A. BRAY MAJ, AR 02205942 |
| S5 | ROBERT J. BUSCH CPT, INF OF117329 |
| Signal Officer | VICTOR R. SHAVERS MAJ, SC OF118965 |
| Brigade Chaplain | ALVIN STEVENS MAJ, CH 02309534 |

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3D BRIGADE



9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

VIETNAM

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96371

AVDE-BCO

21 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) for Period
ending 30 June 1969

Commanding General
9th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDE-MH
APO 96370

SECTION I: Significant Organizational/Unit Activities.

1. (C) Introduction:

a. During the reporting period, the 3d Brigade continued operations in Long An Province with the Brigade Headquarters located at Tan An. Operation Toan Thang (Phase III) continued throughout the reporting period. Operation Toan Thang's objective is to seek out the enemy with aggressive combined operations in Long An Province, prevent his employment of men and equipment. An indication of Toan Thang's success is that the enemy remains fragmented and has not been able to mount a major offensive.

b. During the reporting period, the 3d Brigade was involved in 60 days in combat operations. Refresher training for the small units and individual soldier was conducted during periods of stand down and when combat conditions allowed.

2. (C) Organization:

a. From the beginning of the reporting period until 2 June 1969, the Go Devil Brigade had three maneuver battalions attached, 2-47 Infantry (Mech), 2-60 Infantry and the 5-60 Infantry. On 2 June 1969, an additional maneuver battalion, the 3-7 Infantry 199th LIB, came under the operational control of the 3d Brigade. B/3-17 Cav supported the Brigade throughout the reporting period. Direct artillery support was provided by the 2-4 Artillery. Normal combat service support units also supported the Brigade. The organizational structure is included in Inclosure 1.

b. Unit disposition of the 3d Brigade during the reporting period is as follows:

(1) 2-47 Infantry (M) continues to be located at Binh Phuoc.

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GROUP 4
DECLASSIFIED AT THREE YEAR INTERVAL
DECLASSIFIED AFTER TWELVE YEARS
DCI DIR 5200.10

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- (2) 2-60 Infantry continues to be located at Tan Tru.
- (3) 5-60 Infantry continues to be located at Rach Kien.
- (4) 3-7 Infantry (2 June - 30 June 1969) is located at Can Giuoc.
- (5) Artillery combat support activities:

(a) During the reporting period, the direct support for the 3d Brigade was received from the 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery.

(b) General support to the 3d Brigade was furnished by the following units during the periods indicated:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>TYPE</u> | <u>PERIOD</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|-------------|-------------|----------------|-----------------|
| E/5-42 Arty | 155 T | 1 May - 30 Jun | Can Giuoc |
| C/5-42 Arty | 155 T | 1 May - 30 Jun | Thu Thua |
| A/1-84 Arty | 155 SP | 1 May - 30 Jun | Tan Tru |
| A/7-8 Arty | 175/6" SP | 1 May - 30 Jun | Ben Luc |
| B/2-40 Arty | 105 T | 2 - 30 Jun | Can Giuoc |

(c) A statistical chart is as follows:

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>CONFIRMED TARGETS</u> | <u>ACQUIRED TARGETS</u> | <u>COUNTER BATTERY TARGETS</u> | <u>PREPARATION TARGETS</u> |
|-------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 28 - 30 Apr | 30 | 15 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 - 31 May | 236 | 350 | 87 | 47 |
| 1 - 30 Jun | 191 | 569 | 61 | 55 |

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>INTERDICTION TARGETS</u> | <u>SPECIAL PURPOSE TARGETS</u> | <u>ARVN SUPPORT TARGETS</u> | <u>TOTAL ROUNDS FIRED</u> |
|-------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 28 - 30 Apr | 2 | 13 | 16 | 3,525 |
| 1 - 31 May | 29 | 155 | 116 | 26,824 |
| 1 - 30 Jun | 78 | 222 | 213 | 28,245 |

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3. (U) Personnel and Administration:

a. Strength: During the reporting period, 3d Brigade officer strength levels were generally good with an average of 94.5 percent assigned versus authorized and 92 percent present for duty versus assigned. At the present time, the overall officer strength percentages are 98.1 and 96.5 respectively. Although the percentage of authorized Captains is 71 percent as of 30 June 1969, it will increase in the near future. Enlisted strength figures averaged 98.2 percent assigned versus authorized and 95.8 percent present for duty versus assigned. Of authorized IOS 11 series personal, the Brigade has 97.3 percent assigned.

b. Casualties:

| | |
|-------------------------|-----|
| (1) Killed in Action | 30 |
| (2) Died of Wounds | 3 |
| (3) Non - hostile Death | 0 |
| (4) Missing in Action | 0 |
| (5) Wounded in Action | 471 |
| (6) Miscellaneous | 0 |

c. Discipline, Law and Order:

| | |
|----------------------------|----------------|
| (1) Articles 15 imposed | 133 |
| (2) Summary Courts-Martial | 2 |
| (3) Special Courts-Martial | 21 - 3 pending |
| (4) General Courts-Martial | 0 - 1 pending |

d. Maintenance of Morale: The biggest improvements in morale resulted from the Mobile PX, Mars Station, hand shaking tours and USC shows.

e. R & R

| | Authorized | Utilized* |
|--------------------|------------|-----------|
| (1) Out of Country | 565 | 490 |
| (2) In Country | 65 | 51 |

* - these figures do not include standby's

f. Religious services totaled 326 with an attendance of 4041 personnel. The Brigade Chaplain conducted 19 memorial services with an attendance of 1592 personnel.

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g. Awards and Decorations were as follows: D&C 3; SS 119; DFC 7; SM 5; BS (V) 743; BS 1,407; AL 703; ACP (V) 806; and ACM 1,641.

h. Medical: US personnel treated in 3d Brigade dispensaries totaled 8,206.

i. Military Police Activities:

(1) There were six incidents occurring in the 3d Brigade which required a serious incident report (SIR).

(2) Traffic accidents during the period totaled 7; one of which required a serious incident report.

4. (C) Intelligence

a. Order of battle.

(1) The 506 Battalion (AKA 1st Long An Battalion) is held to be operating east of Can Giuoc City. They still remain in position to act as one of the spearhead battalions in an attack against Saigon. The unit has an estimated strength of three hundred personnel, two-thirds of which are North Vietnamese.

(2) The 508 Battalion (AKA 2d Long An Battalion) has an estimated strength of two hundred personnel, and are located in Northwestern Can Giuoc. The battalion remains fragmented into 3-5 man cells, avoiding contact. They are still held as being targeted against Saigon.

(3) The Dong Phu Battalion is carried in its normal AO Northwest of Can Giuoc, along the CLD border. Contacts occurring in mid June and a PW captured on 21 June indicate that the battalion remains in its normal AO. The unit is held at a strength of 115 personnel.

(4) The 520 Battalion is operating Northwest of Can Duoc City. It's current mission is undetermined. The strength of this unit is approximately 200 personnel.

(5) The 265 Battalion is held located South and East of Can Giuoc City operating as a security force for units moving through the area. The battalion has an estimated strength of 100 personnel.

(6) The 308 Battalion is located in Northern Ben Luc. The battalion has a strength of 175 men and is believed targeted against the Ben Luc area and the Republic of Vietnam Pacification Program in Ben Luc and Binh Chanh Districts. In a June contact with the 308 Battalion, the Battalion CO and PO were killed and the battalion XO was captured.

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(7) The 267 Battalion is currently operating north of Ben Luc City, possibly to replace the 308 Battalion, whose leadership was decimated in late June. The Battalion has an estimated strength of 300 personnel.

(8) The local force companies in Long An Province continue to remain in their respective areas of operations. Local forces have been reduced significantly in strength due to persistent operations by Allied Forces. They continue to act as guides and security forces for the main force battalions in Long An to include the 1st NVA Regiment.

(a) The VC Ben Thu (D) local force companies:

1. The C1 Company operates north of Ben Luc with a strength of 40 men.
2. The C2 Company operates in Ben Duc (V) with a strength of 40 men.
3. The C3 Company operates south of VC Island with a strength of 30 men.

(b) The Binh Phuoc Local Force Company is known as C-313 Chau Thanh Company with a strength of 45 men.

(c) The Tan Tru Local Force Companies:

1. The C314 Company operates in An Nhut Tan, northern Tan Tru (D) with a strength of 30 men.
2. The C2 Company operates in the Elbow area and Binh Trinh Dang, with a strength of 40 men.

(d) The Can Duoc (D) Local Force Companies:

1. The C1 Can Duoc Company operates in GVN Can Duoc, strength 35 men.
2. The C2 Can Duoc Company operates in GVN Rach Kien, strength 20 men.

(e) The Can Giouc Local Force Companies:

1. The C1 Can Giouc Company operates in upper Can Giouc, strength 35 men.
2. The C2 Can Giouc Company operates in lower Can Giouc with a strength of 60 men.

(9) The 1st NVA Regiment consists of three battalions, a headquarters element and support companies.

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(a) The K4 Battalion (AKA 308 Battalion) is located in western Rach Kien with an estimated strength of 225 men. Last contact was on 14 July when elements of the 46th ARVN Regiment contacted the unit in western Rach Kien.

(b) The K-5 Battalion (AKA Dong Nai) is located in Tan Tru District with a strength of 325 men. A PW from the C20, captured 20 June 1969, gave location of K5 as just north of Tan Tru (D).

(c) The K-6 Battalion (AKA 268 Battalion) is located in Binh Phuoc and southern Thu Thua with a strength of 225 men. Last contact with this unit was on 8 June 1969.

(d) The support companies are numbered from C-16 to C-25 of which four have been identified.

1. C-16 (82mm mortar Co) operating in Rach Kien with a strength of 68 men.

2. C-18 (12.7mm Antiaircraft MG Company) operating in western Rach Kien with a strength of 100 men.

3. C-20 (1 Crypto Flat, 1 Telephone Flat, 1 Commo Liaison Flat) have a strength of 25 men.

4. C-25 (Sapper/107 Rocket Company) operating in western Rach Kien with a strength of 40-45 men.

(e) The remainder of the support companies remain dispersed throughout Long An Province with a strength totalling approximately 250 men.

(10) The 3d Artillery Battalion of SR-3 remains dispersed throughout Long An Province with a strength of approximately 250 men.

b. Enemy Tactics and Techniques:

(1) The enemy has continued to harass by indirect small fire attacks on Allied base camps and artillery outposts, employing 107 rockets and 57mm RR and 75mm mortars with increased frequency.

(2) Enemy units are broken down into squad and even cell type units and dispersed throughout their AO's, hiding in the nippa palm and moving at night.

(3) They are purposely avoiding contact in order to resupply, reinforce and reorganize. The K-4, K-5, and K-6 Battalions especially are believed to be experiencing rear service resupply difficulties.

(4) The enemy is now in the midst of their summer offensive. The offensive started in May and will continue through August, with high points occurring on 11 May, 5-6 June, and 18-20 June. The next high point is expected on or about 20 July.

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(5) The overall emphasis of the VC summer campaign will be countering increased US pacification efforts, such as the hamlet Evaluation System and Accelerated Chieu Hoi Programs. Likely future anti-pacification targets for the enemy include new RF positions in My An Phu, Thu Thua, small RF/PF outposts in Can Giuoc and eastern Binh Phuoc as well as Province Chieu Hoi Center.

(6) Documents captured on 10 May 69 indicate the formation of a "Combined Command Group" in SR III. A circular from the Chau Thanh District Party Committee to all party committee members and village party members in Chau Thanh revealed the new Combined Command Group by SR-III to effect all SR-III districts in Long An. The group, it stated, should command 3 coordinated forces, viz main forces, local forces, and guerrilla forces in attacking the enemy politically, militarily, and through troop proselyting. This Combined Command Group, it asserted, was to be composed of representatives of both the district party and party command structure of the 1st NVA Regiment responsible to the sub-region party committee, would study existing situations and recommend specific objectives for attack and plan coordination of guerrilla, local and main forces in such attacks, to include political and propagandistic activity.

(7) Documents also indicate VC/NVA concern over new engineer road buildings in eastern Binh Phuoc. The K-6 Battalion was given the mission of interdicting friendly activity along the entire length of Route 21 in Binh Phuoc, especially to protect the strong VC village at Thuan My. Offensive actions against these road building activities may be expected.

c. Intelligence Assets: During the reporting period the following assets were available to the 3d Brigade:

(1) One (1) Combat Tracker Team was held at 3d Brigade Headquarters on a standby basis. The team was employed extensively when the tactical situation dictated.

(2) Four (4) Scout Dog Teams have been under the 3d Brigade's control during the reporting period. One to two teams are held on a standby basis to provide flexibility in the full utilization of the teams.

(3) Rangers: The Brigade has usually three (3) to four (4) teams in direct support for reconnaissance and "parakeet" flights. The rangers have infiltrated by track, helicopter, FV'd and stay behind operations.

(4) Five (5) Radar Teams are under the 3d Brigade's operational control. The Radar (AN/FPS-5) can detect and locate personnel at ranges up to five kilometers.

(5) Duffle bag sensors are placed along known or suspected infiltration and commo-liason routes to detect enemy movement. Sensors are placed in unpopulated areas and are covered by artillery fire.

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(6) The 525 and 9th MI run extensive agent nets in Long An Province and continuous areas detecting enemy movement.

(7) SLAR, Red Haze, and People Sniffers support the 3d Brigade in target acquisition. Used extensively in the Plain of Reeds, these sensors can detect enemy movement and direction.

(8) Interrogation of Prisoners of War (IPW) Teams are located in Tan An. Utilized extensively in interrogation of detainees, the IPW Team has significantly aided in the detection of the enemy and identifying the unit of the detainees.

d. Estimate of Enemy Situation:

(1) The Corps wide high point of early May was best illustrated in Long An Province by a large contact outside the City of Thu Thua, where over 100 BVA of the 267 Battalion were surrounded during a violent two day action. This Corps wide high point, was characterized generally by augmented indirect fire attacks, but was not held to be the commencing point of the Summer Offensive, 1969, which started in June and may be expected to continue until August throughout all III Corps. High Point for Long An Province during this period included contacts with the 508 Battalion on 16 June (5 PW's captured), large contacts with the 308 and 267 Battalions of SR II, during the period 29 June - 4 July, and with sector and ARVN Forces killing, wounding or capturing 58 VC/NVA of the K4 NVA Regiment and 14th, 15th Sapper Companies during 12-13 July.

(2) The enemy may be expected to avoid contact, continue hiding in small groups and continue resupply, reinforcement and reorganization activities.

Another Corps-Wide offensive high points may be expected on or prox 20 July, to be characterized by increased indirect fire attacks on ARVN outposts, Sapper attacks, and isolated ground probes.

5. (C) Operations: At the beginning of the reporting period, 3d Brigade CP was located at Tan An and remained there throughout the reporting period. Operation Toan Thang (Phase III) continued throughout the reporting period with no change in mission.

a. 27-30 April: On 27/30 April A/2-47 Infantry (M) while moving to their night location engaged and killed seven VC and captured four weapons west of Tan Tru (XS 7062). There were 55 enemy killed during these four days in widely scattered airmobile and footmobile contacts.

b. 1-3 May: On 3 May, 2-60 Infantry conducted Airmobile operations northeast of Tan An (XS 5968) and developed several contacts throughout the day killing nine VC (BC). In other scattered contacts from 1-3 May, 3d Brigade killed 18 VC (BC).

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c. 4-6 May: On 4 May, A/5-60 Infantry led by a Chieu Hoi, airmobile assaulted into an area southeast of Binh Phuoc (KS 6750). Contact was made at 1230 hours with an estimated 10 - 15 VC. B/3-17 Cav and E/2-4 Arty supported resulting in a total of 14 VC killed. There were no friendly casualties. There were 27 VC killed in other sporadic contacts from 4-6 May.

d. 5-7 May: In this period, most of the results were obtained by airmobile operations. There were 25 enemy killed in scattered contacts.

e. 8-9 May: On 8 May, 2-60 Infantry conducted airmobile operations north-east of Tan An (KS 5865) and killed 11 VC, captured 3 AK - 47's, and sustained two US wounded in seven separate contacts. At 1600 hours, based on a sympathizer's information that ten VC were buried northwest of Tan An (KS 4368) C/2-47 Infantry (M) was dispatched to the area. A search revealed ten bodies which were credited to C/5-42 Arty. In other separate contacts on 8-9 May, the Go Devils killed 30 VC.

f. 10-11 May: In this period, the Brigade forces killed 30 of the enemy. On 11 May, 2-60 Infantry conducted airmobile operations, inserting A Company and the Recon Element southeast of Ben Luc (KS 6573). At 1300 hours, A Company came in contact with an estimated VC platoon. B/3-17 Cav and 240th gunships supported with sporadic contact terminating at 1750 hours, resulting in 16 VC killed, 1 AK - 47, 3 carbines, 1 SFS and assorted web gear captured. There was one US wounded.

g. 12-13 May: On 12 May at 0500 hours an Artillery AO was dispatched to conduct a visual reconnaissance of an area southwest of Thu Thua where on 11 May, the Personnel Detector (People Sniffer) had two significant readings and the night SLAR aircraft detected four suspected hostile returns, northwest, west and southwest of Thu Thua. During the reconnaissance, the AO received heavy automatic weapons fire from an unknown size VC force. B/3-17 Cav was directed to the area and also received heavy fire. Based on the intelligence indicators and heavy firing, the 3d Brigade reacted. Recon/2-47 Infantry (M) was the first US element in the area. The platoon shortly established contact. Estimates as to the size of the enemy force increased from a reinforced platoon to a much larger force. Coordination was made to commence a combined operation to encircle the target. The combined friendly forces consisted of Recon/2-47 Infantry (M), B, C; D/2-60 Infantry; B, D/5-60 Infantry; one company each from the 2d and 3d Battalions, 50th ARVN Regiment; 2 PF platoons, 4 RF companies and one FRU platoon. Additional support was committed in the form of assault helicopter company assets, air cavalry, and air strikes by 7th USAF. Heavy contact continued to develop with continuous artillery, 30 Tac Air sorties and gunship strikes supporting the combined forces. Initial readouts of PW's indicated the presence of the 267th NVA Battalion. Leaflet drops were flown attempting to destroy the enemy's will to fight and to encourage him to Chieu Hoi. Contact continued into the night with Tac Air, Artillery, and LFT's working the area under illumination provided by Spooky and Shadow. At first light,

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B/3-17 Cav conducted a visual reconnaissance of the area noticing several trails leading to the northwest. US, ARVN, and territorial forces conducted a sweep of the battlefield with B, D/5-60 Infantry conducting airmobile assaults to the northwest in pursuit of the enemy. By 2000 hours, 13 May the combined sweep and pursuit terminated. Final results of the combined operations were 91 enemy killed, six H's, 16 crew served weapons and 15 individual weapons captured. Combined friendly losses were four killed and 37 wounded. Three APC's and seven aircraft were damaged. Due to the destruction caused by this engagement, combined activities were immediately organized to provide shelter for 3000 refugees. Medical care and food were made available.

h. 14-15 May: On 141232 May, D/2-60 Infantry made an airmobile assault southwest of Ben Luc (XS 6774). Gunships observed 20-30 VC with weapons evading and additional elements of Co's A, D and Recon/2-60 Infantry were inserted to cordon the enemy. Sporadic contact continued throughout the afternoon and on into the evening with B/3-17 Cav, Artillery and Tac Air in support. Six US were wounded while US forces killed 39 of the enemy and captured two crew served and 16 individual weapons.

i. 16-18 May; On 16 May, the 5-60 Infantry conducted airmobile operations with three companies east of Thu Thua (XS 6573). Contacts were sporadic throughout the day with Companies A, B and D killing nine VC and capturing one Chicom machine gun, and one AK-47. On 17 May, the Go Devils killed eight VC in scattered contacts. On 18 May, 2-47 Infantry (M) conducted bushmaster operations south of Tan Tru (XS 6860) killing four enemy in three contacts. The 2-60 Infantry on airmobile assaults north of Binh Phuoc (XS 5756) killed three VC and captured one machinegun and one AK-47 in three contacts. In other scattered activity five enemy were killed.

j. 19-20 May: On 18 May, 5-60 Infantry conducted airmobile operations north of Tan Tru. Companies A and E supported by B/3-17 Cav killed 15 VC and captured three AK-47's. In other contacts, six enemy were killed. On 20 May, 2-60 Infantry conducted airmobile assaults north of Tan Tru with the 240th AHC. The Infantry, supported by B/3-17 Cav accounted for 13 VC killed. A/5-60 Infantry conducted a combined cordon and search with Cho Gao District forces east of Binh Phuoc and accounted for eight enemy killed. The USAF and 2-4 Arty supported 3d Brigade accounting for ten enemy killed in other scattered contacts.

k. 21-23 May: On 21 May, Recon/2-60 Infantry with B/3-17 Cav killed six VC northeast of Binh Phuoc (XS 6657). On 22 May, Recon, A/5-60 Infantry killed seven enemy and captured three AK-47's, one RPG launcher and three B-40 rounds while on airmobile operations northwest of Can Giuoc (XS 8075). On 23 May, B/5-60 Infantry conducted operations south of Can Giuoc (XS 8563) apprehending eight detainees and capturing one M16, one AK-47, one Chicom carbine, one K54 pistol and one 30 cal pistol.

l. 24-26 May: On 24 May, A, B/5-60 Infantry, B/2-47 Infantry (M) and 849th

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AVDE-BCO

21 July 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (OULL) for period ending 30 June 1966

RF Company from Ben Luc conducted a combined cordon and search southeast of Ben Luc resulting in three enemy killed, one detainee apprehended, and two AK-47's captured. In other operations, 3d Brigade elements killed seven VC. In a special night watermobile raid on 21 May, Recon/5-60 Infantry killed six VC North of Tan Tru (XS 6569). In other contacts, eight enemy were killed and two AK-47's captured. On 26 May, Recon/5-60 Infantry on night watermobile operations southwest of Rach Kien (XS 7265) killed five VC. Six enemy were killed in other contacts by Go Devil elements during the day.

m. 27-28 May: On 27 May, while operating south east of VC Island, B/2-60 Infantry was engaged by an estimated VC platoon with heavy automatic weapons fire. B/3-17 Cav supported and results showed 16 enemy killed and two individual weapons captured while Co B sustained two killed and four wounded. On 28 May, at 1215 hours, Recon/5-60 Infantry was inserted in the vicinity of the Eagle's Beak (XS 5977). At 1235 hours, Recon made contact with an unknown size VC force with five US killed and three wounded. B/3-17 Cav, 240th AHC, Artillery, Tac Air and Navy PBR's supported while Co's B and C were inserted. Results were 21 VC (BC).

n. 29-31 May: On 29-31 May, A/5-60 Infantry operating northwest of Can Duoc (XS 7264) observed and engaged an estimated 75 VC with small arms, automatic weapons and 90mm recoilless rifle fire. B/3-17 Cav, A/2-4 Arty and an US Flareship supported. A search of the area revealed six VC killed by A/5-60 Infantry and three VC killed by A/2-4 Arty. A/5-60 Infantry also captured one AK-47. On 30 May, the Go Devils conducted defensive and security operations during a 24 hour cease fire. 3d Brigade elements killed five VC and sustained nine wounded throughout the day. On 31-05 May, Recon/5-60 Infantry, operating southwest of Rach Kien killed five VC and captured one AK-47.

o. 1-3 June: On 1 June D/2-60 Infantry was inserted at 1050 hours in the Eagle's Beak (XS 5377) and combined with the 240th AHC gunships to kill a total of 14 VC. Co D also apprehended two detainees and captured three K-54 pistols and one 45 cal pistol. On 2 June, A/2-60 Infantry inserted at 0740 hours northwest of Can Duoc (XS 7264) and combined with B/3-17 Cav to kill seven VC and capture two AK-47's and four field packs. C/2-60 Infantry inserted at 0922 hours southeast of Ben Luc (XS 6674) and combined with the Air Force and Artillery to kill seven VC and capture one AK-47, one RPG launcher and one B-40 rocket. On 032130 June, Recon/5-60 Infantry operating southwest of Rach Kien (XS 7167) received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated 15 VC. The platoon returned fire, Artillery, 9th Aviation light fire team supported and contact broke at 2220 hours. A search of the area resulted in five VC killed and two pistols and one AK-47 captured.

p. 4-6 June: On 4-5 June, 3d Brigade elements killed 19 VC in scattered contacts. On 6 June at 1015 hours, an RF Co from Binh Phuoc reported in contact with an estimated 50 VC south of Binh Phuoc (XS 6052). B/3-17 Cav supported

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21 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORLL) for period ending 30 June 1969

and B/2-47 Infantry (H) moved to the area of contact to reinforce. Contact broke at 1330 hours with ten VC killed. Co B also captured a 60mm mortar tube. The 2-60 Infantry conducted airmobile operations, inserting Co D at 1615 hours southeast of Bon Luc (XS 6574). Co D combined with B/3-17 Cav and 240th AHC to kill a total of 13 VC.

q. 7-9 June: On 7 June, 21 VC were killed in scattered contacts. Seven VC were killed in scattered contacts on 8 June. At 091730 June, B/2-60 Infantry operating north of Tan Tru (XS 6565) engaged and unknown size VC force. B/3-17 Cav and 240th AHC gunships supported. The VC broke contact at 1850 hours and a search revealed 12 enemy killed. At 2110 hours, Recon/5-60 Infantry operating aboard US Navy FBK's in the "Elbow Area" (XS 7164) engaged and killed seven VC.

r. 10-12 June: On 10 June, B/2-60 Infantry operating south of the eastern "mouse ear" (XS 7152) found a cache containing one M-2 carbine, one Browning automatic rifle, 1700 M-60 rounds, five B-40 rockets, one mine, 270 small arms rounds, and 50 blocks of Chicom C-4. On 11 June 1969, elements of the 3d Brigade killed 21 VC in widely scattered contacts. On 12 June, Recon/5-60 Infantry received fire southwest of Can Giuoc (XS 7970). Fire was returned and contact broke immediately. A search revealed six VC killed and three AK-47's captured. At 1742 hours, Ranger Team #16 operating northeast of Binh Phuoc (XS 6457) received fire from an estimated 25 VC. The Rangers returned fire, Artillery and B/3-17 Cav supported, and contact broke immediately. Nine VC were killed and one AK-47 captured.

s. 13-16 June: On 132200 June, vicinity XS 5358, A/2-47 Infantry (A) was engaged by an estimated VC platoon while conducting bushmaster operations. Artillery and a night gunner package from the 9th Aviation Battalion supported and contact broke at 2250 hours. A search revealed 13 VC killed, two AK-47's, one RPD machine gun and eight 60mm mortar rounds destroyed. On 14-16 June, 3d Brigade elements killed 32 VC and captured 11 weapons in scattered contacts. On 16 June, D/3-7 Infantry acting on intelligence from a Chieu Hoi at 0750 hours made contact southwest of Can Giuoc (XS 7970) which continued sporadically throughout the day. B/3-17 Cav, Artillery and 240th AHC gunships supported the contact. Total enemy losses were 15 killed, three weapons captured and six detainees apprehended. Two Chieu Hoi's also rallied.

t. 17-21 June: On 17 June, 2-60 Infantry in four separate contacts killed 26 VC with support from US Artillery, B/3-17 Cav and 240th AHC. From 18 to 21 June, 3d Brigade elements killed 24 of the enemy and captured seven weapons in widely scattered contacts.

u. 22-25 June: On 23 June, the aerial rifle platoon of B/3-17 Cav was inserted southeast of Binh Phuoc (XS 6653) and combined with their gunships and artillery to kill a total of 15 VC.

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AVDE-BCO

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (OILL) for period ending 30 June 1969

21 July 1969

v. 26-30 June: On 27 June, A/2-47 Infantry (L) and Recon/2-47 Infantry (M) engaged a VC force at 1635 hours southwest of VC Island (XS 4670) and sporadic contact continued until 1930 hours, with USAF, 240th AHC and B/3-17 Cav and Artillery supporting. Results of the contact showed 24 VC killed and six weapons captured. On 30 June, B/2-60 Infantry was led to a cache by a Det (XS 6270). The cache contained 43 B-40 rounds, three 82mm mortar rounds, one 57mm recoilless rifle, 4 1/2 pounds of plastic explosive, 78 60mm mortar rounds, 21 mortar charges and one can of documents

6. (C) Logistics:

a. General

(1) Combat Service Support of Operations was accomplished without any serious limiting factors.

(2) On 1 June 1969 the 3d Brigade gained OPCON of the 3-7 Infantry of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (S p). Close coordination with the S-4's of the units involved resulted in an efficient supply system for the 3-7 Infantry. Class I including ice, III, V, and limited Class IV were provided from 9th Infantry Division assets, and all other supplies were delivered from the 199th Infantry Brigade's rear base.

b. Supply

(1) Supply activities in general were normal during the reporting period. Units continued to draw Class II and V supplies from the Division Logistics base at Dong Tam. Class I including ice and Class III were drawn from the FSE at Tan An. Class IV, bunker and barrier materials, were drawn from 9th S&T Engineer Supplies at Division.

(2) Delivery of Classes I, II, III, IV, and V was by unit pickup with the following exceptions:

(a) Classes I, III, and V were air lifted from Division to the 3-7 Infantry at Can Giuoc.

(b) Class V was delivered by air to 2-47 Infantry (M).

(c) DTC provided vehicles for delivery of Class IV when unit organic transportation was not adequate.

(3) Repair parts continued to be drawn from D/709 Maintenance Battalion at Ben Luc. The availability of PLL remained adequate with no serious shortages.

(4) During the month of June the supply of dry cell batteries was transferred from the responsibility of D/709 Maintenance Battalion to the Class I

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AVDE-BCO

21 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (OILL) for period ending 30 June 1969

Supply Point under Project Orange Ball. However, Project Orange Ball was not implemented and batteries with a high demand were in short supply. Beginning 17 July 1969 batteries were requisitioned through the Class I Supply Point, though there was not a sufficient quantity on hand within the Division supply channels. High demand dry cell batteries were expedited from Long Binh Depot to fill the Brigade's requirements.

c. Maintenance

(1) 2-60 Infantry, 5-60 Infantry, and HHC 3d Brigade received the annual CMMI Inspection during the reporting period. All three units received satisfactory scores on the inspections. 2-47 Infantry (M) is presently preparing for the CMMI Inspection.

(2) Roadside spot checks and informal inspections were conducted by D/709 Maintenance Battalion in conjunction with Military Police spot checks. The spot checks, together with continuous command emphasis on vehicular maintenance, have resulted in a gradual decline throughout the reporting period in the percentages of reportable items deadlined.

d. Transportation

Organic transportation has been adequate to meet limited tactical movement and most administrative requirements of the Brigade. Exceptions are Class IV delivery and occasional transportation of water. Water is being transported from Tan An to Tan Tru, 2-60 Infantry, and to Binh Phuoc, 2-47 Infantry (M). During the times when a water tanker is deadlined, other than organic transportation was required and obtained from 9th S&T Battalion.

7. (C) Military Civic Action:

a. Military Civic Action

(1) The Military Civic Action Program in Long An Province has shown a marked increase during this reporting period. Indication of the progress made by this program is the increase of 10,000 people treated by our ICAP, MEDCAP and NITCAP Teams during this period over the last reporting period, a period covering ninety days compared to the sixty day period covered by this report.

(2) The number of operations and the number of civilian personnel treated by qualified medics are as follows:

| | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| (a) Total Operations: | <u>NITCAP</u> | <u>ICAP</u> | <u>MEDCAP</u> |
| | 122 | 435 | 192 |

(b) Total Number Treated: 52,639.

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AVDE-BCO

21 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (OULL) for period ending 30 June 1969

(3) S5 activities include civic action construction projects to improve the living conditions and transportation routes in the province. These programs are targeted for short duration - high impact results. Many of these projects are joint US/Vietnamese ventures with the US forces supplying materials and technical guidance and the Vietnamese providing the labor force. The following is a list of projects completed during this period.

- (a) Dwellings - 377 repaired 18 constructed
- (b) Roads - 49 K repaired 2 K constructed.
- (c) Bridges - 3 repaired
- (d) Schools - 2 repaired

(4) The following is a list of construction materials distributed throughout Long An Province during the reporting period.

- (a) Cement - 35,000 lbs
- (b) Tin - 4,889 sheets
- (c) Lumber - 195,00 board feet
- (d) Lime - 750 lbs
- (e) Culvert - 50 sections
- (f) Sand and Gravel - 250 dump truck loads
- (g) Fill - 3,000 dump truck loads
- (h) 55 gallon water containers - 100
- (i) Nails - 60 lbs

(5) On 12 May 1969, a major battle occurred in Thu Thua District which left 366 families homeless. A major effort was directed by 3d Brigade to restore the village. Of the above total, the following quantities of construction materials were devoted to this one project.

- (a) Lumber - 107,000 board feet
- (b) Tin - 676 sheets
- (c) Lime - 750 lbs
- (d) 55 gallon containers - 100

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AVDE-BCO

21 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (O.L.L) for period ending 30 June 1969

(6) In addition to these construction materials, the following other action was taken to alleviate conditions in the village.

- (a) 300 rat traps distributed
- (b) 500 blankets distributed
- (c) 700 five gallon water containers distributed
- (d) 5,000 gallon drinking water provided daily until 1 June 1969.
- (e) MEDCAPs conducted daily until 1 June 1969.
- (f) 6,000 paper cups and plates distributed.

(7) During the conduct of MEDCAPs, ICAPs and NITECAPs, our teams distributed various health items and commodities. The following items were distributed during this period.

(a) Health Kits - 700 (Consisting of towel, soap, comb, toothbrush, and toothpaste)

(b) School Kits - 490 (Consisting of ruler, eraser, pencil, pen, tablet and ink)

(c) Foodstuffs - 2,045 lbs

(d) Soap - 4,550 bars

(e) Candy - 125 lbs

(f) GVN T-Shirts - 275 ea

(g) Tobacco - 170 cans

(h) Mosquito Nets - 25 (Rach Kien Hospital Maternity Ward)

(i) Balloons - 4,000

(8) A total of 88 English language classes were held by Brigade elements with a total enrollment of 82 people. In addition, two Vietnamese women are being trained as nurses to assist on MEDCAP operations and one male is being trained as a mechanic.

(9) Brigade elements have continued to sponsor needy children for operations

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AVDE-BCO

21 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORLL) for period ending 30 June 1969

at Cho Ray Hospital in Saigon and amputees at the National Rehabilitation Institute. During this period, 1 May to 30 June, the following operations were performed:

- (a) Cleft Palate repair - 5
- (b) Correction of Harelip - 5
- (c) Hernia - 1
- (d) Artificial arm - 1
- (e) Artificial leg - 1

b. Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

(1) During this reporting period, PSYOP was directed against VC/NVA forces and neutral or sympathetic civilians.

(a) Themes directed against enemy forces were:

- 1. Loss of personnel and equipment without supply.
- 2. Lack of support of VC/NVA among civilians.
- 3. Hopelessness of winning against firepower of FWMAF and GVN.
- 4. Poor medical facilities and assistance.
- 5. Constant pressure of GVN and FWMAF.

(b) Themes directed at civilians were as follows:

- 1. The increasing strength of GVN and that the VC/NVA forces are losing.
- 2. VC destroy, GVN builds.
- 3. Third party inducement.
- 4. Explain GVN policies and benefits of policies to people.
- 5. Availability of medical assistance.

(2) All PSYOP activities increased during this reporting period to bring these objectives to the people. Face to face communication during ICAPs and MEDCAPs increased.

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AVDE-BCO

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORLL) for period ending 30 June 1969

21 July 1969

- (3) PSYOP equipment and status:
 - (a) Two each 1000 watt speaker system (operational)
 - (b) One each 500 watt speaker system (operational)
 - (c) One each MSQ 85 PSYOP Van (operational)
- (4) Operations conducted during this reporting period were as follows:
 - (a) Ground loudspeaker time - 555 hours, 50 minutes.
 - (b) Aerial loudspeaker time - 122 hours, 45 minutes.
 - (c) Aerial leaflet dissemination - 8,183,000
 - (d) Ground leaflet dissemination - 230,304
 - (e) Contact missions - 23
 - (f) Hoi Chanh - 27 (3d Brigade) 426 total
 - (g) Hoi Chanh exploited - 8
 - (h) Rapid reaction leaflets - 29
 - (i) Movies shown - 20 hours, 30 minutes
- (5) Problems encountered:
 - (a) Problems with equipment and availability to obtain required spare parts.

SECTION II Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation and recommendations

- 1. (U) Personnel: None
- 2. (U) Intelligence: None
- 3. (U) Operations: None
- 4. (U) Training: None

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AVDE-ECO

21 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (OILL) for period ending 30 June 1969

5. (U) Logistics: None
6. (U) Military Civic Actions: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Incls:


- 1 - Organization Structure
- 2 - Roster Key Personnel
- 3 - List of AO's (9 Tabs)
- 4 - Statistical Review (2 Tabs)

Clyde R. Bennett Jr.
CLYDE R. BENNETT JR.
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

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3D BRIGADE
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

1 May - 1 June 1969



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
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3d BRIGADE

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

2 June - 30 June 1969



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KEY PERSONNEL ROSTER

COMMANDING OFFICER
COL Dale J. Crittenberger 1 May - 30 June 1969

EXECUTIVE OFFICER
LTC Gregory P. Dillon 1 May - 21 May 1969
LTC Leo P. Sikorski 22 May - 15 June 1969
LTC William N. Ciccolo 16 June - 30 June 1969

S-1 ADMINISTRATION
MAJ Daniel S. Costello 1 May - 30 June 1969

S-2
MAJ Richard D. Welch Jr 1 May - 30 June 1969

S-3
MAJ Ronald W. Crooks 1 May - 30 June 1969

S-4
CPT William E. Myers 1 May - 30 June 1969

2-47 INF BATTALION COMMANDER
LTC Douglas S. Smith 1 May - 30 June 1969

2-60 INF BATTALION COMMANDER
LTC Fred K. Mahaffey 1 May - 21 May 1969
LTC Gregory P. Dillon 22 May - 30 June 1969

5-60 INF BATTALION COMMANDER
LTC Edward P. Ciccolo 1 May - 15 June 1969
LTC Leo P. Sikorski 16 June - 30 June 1969

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3d Brigade Go Devils

"ORLL"

1 May - 30 June 1969

AO INCLOSURES


TAB A - AO Tiger
TAB B - AO Lion
TAB C - AO Cheeta
TAB D - AO Bear
TAB E - AO Caterpillar
TAB F - AO Leopard
TAB G - AO Mongoose
TAB H - AO Panther
TAB I - AO Orangoutang

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SEPERATED FROM CLASSIFIED TABS

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


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Sheets 6229, 6230, 6329


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
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



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


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
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+ 82

78
+ 55




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
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TAB H to INCL 3 to 3d Bde ORLL dated 21 July 1969

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TAB I to INCL 3 to 3d Bde ORLL dated 21 July 1969

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3d Brigade Go Devils

"ORLL"

1 May - 30 June 1969

STATISTICAL INCLOSURES

TAB A Statistical Review May 69

TAB B Statistical Review Jun 69

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SEPERATED FROM CLASSIFIED TABS

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INCL 4 to 3d Bde ORLL dated 21 July 1969

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STATISTICAL REVIEW

3d Brigade "Go Devils"

May 1969

LONG AN PROVINCE

| DATE | FRIENDLY | | ENEMY | CHIEU HOI | POW | WEAPONS | |
|-------|----------|-----|-------|-----------|-----|---------|-----|
| | KIA | WIA | KIA | | | CS | SA |
| 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 3 | 1 | 15 | 19 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| 4 | 0 | 6 | 18 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| 5 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 6 | 1 | 0 | 18 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 |
| 7 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 8 | 0 | 18 | 36 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| 9 | 0 | 2 | 16 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
| 10 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 11 | 0 | 9 | 27 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 7 |
| 12 | 1 | 28 | 68 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| 13 | 1 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 14 | 0 | 31 | 33 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 7 |
| 15 | 0 | 5 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 |
| 16 | 0 | 4 | 14 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| 17 | 0 | 13 | 8 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 10 |
| 18 | 0 | 5 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 19 | 0 | 4 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| 20 | 0 | 7 | 31 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 9 |
| 21 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 22 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 5 |
| 23 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 6 |
| 24 | 0 | 5 | 13 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 5 |
| 25 | 0 | 4 | 14 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| 26 | 0 | 10 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 27 | 1 | 10 | 35 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 |
| 28 | 8 | 25 | 40 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 12 |
| 29 | 2 | 4 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| 30 | 0 | 9 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
| 31 | 0 | 2 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 17 | 260 | 550 | 15 | 35 | 7 | 144 |

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STATISTICAL REVIEW

3d Brigade "Go Devils"

June 1969

LONG AN PROVINCE

| DATE | FRIENDLY | | ENEMY | CHIEU HOI | POW | WEAPONS | |
|-------|----------|-----|-------|-----------|-----|---------|-----|
| | KIA | WIA | KIA | | | CS | SA |
| 1 | 0 | 4 | 24 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 7 |
| 2 | 0 | 4 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| 3 | 2 | 4 | 26 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 2 |
| 4 | 1 | 16 | 12 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
| 5 | 0 | 26 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 6 | 0 | 10 | 32 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 8 |
| 7 | 0 | 8 | 21 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| 8 | 0 | 6 | 12 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
| 9 | 0 | 7 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 10 | 0 | 11 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| 11 | 2 | 2 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 12 | 0 | 6 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 13 | 0 | 16 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| 14 | 0 | 2 | 19 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| 15 | 3 | 7 | 13 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 16 | 0 | 3 | 21 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 4 |
| 17 | 0 | 8 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| 18 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| 19 | 0 | 10 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 20 | 0 | 8 | 10 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| 21 | 4 | 12 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 22 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| 23 | 0 | 2 | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| 24 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 25 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 26 | 0 | 5 | 18 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
| 27 | 4 | 9 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| 28 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 29 | 0 | 5 | 14 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 5 |
| 30 | 0 | 2 | 14 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| TOTAL | 16 | 211 | 489 | 10 | 40 | 6 | 124 |

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT COMMAND, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96370

AVDE-SP-C

20 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) for Period Ending
30 June 1969. RCS/CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

Commanding General
9th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDE-M1
APO 96370

SECTION I: Significant Organizational/Unit Activities:

1. (U) Introduction: The mission of the 9th Infantry Division Support Command (DISCOM) is:
 - a. To provide Division level support, supply, transportation, maintenance (less cryptographic, electronic accounting machines and quartermaster air drop equipment), and other miscellaneous services to all assigned and attached elements of the Division.
 - b. To provide or coordinate the facilities, service, and activities peculiar to Dong Tam Base, to include non-divisional units and organizations.
 - c. To coordinate and control the defense of Dong Tam Base Camp and determine the various states and stages of alert.
2. (C) Organization:
 - a. The organizational structure of the Support Command consists of Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Band, 709th Maintenance Battalion, 9th Supply and Transport Battalion, 9th Administration Company, the 9th Medical Battalion, and the Division Reliable Academy.
 - b. Attached as Inclosure 1 is an organizational chart of the Support Command. Inclosure 2 is a listing of key personnel and Inclosure 3 shows Support Command unit locations.
3. (C) Intelligence: During the reporting period the Division Support Command continued its Dong Tam defense mission. Improvements to the defensive berm have been accomplished. Bravo sector of the berm has rebuilt six (6) bunkers and relocated the sector Command Post to the center of the sector, bunker D-6, for better control. Charlie sector installed three (3) searchlight with pink filters to aid in illuminating the critical area north of Dong Tam. The bridge on the new watch access road at XSA27445 has been fortified with three (3) bunkers, one with watch tower, barbed wire road blocks, a searchlight, trip flare and claymore mines. In addition, this site has been completely surrounded with concertina wire fence and nine booms have been installed up and down stream. Four (4) 60 foot steel watch towers are being installed on each of the four corners of the base camp. One has been completed. Much emphasis has been placed on antisapper defensive measures and a new OICRD for the defense of Dong Tam was published on 20 Jun 69.

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AVDIB-SP-C

20 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) for Period ending 30 June 1969. AFS/CSFOR-65 (A-1) (U)

4. (U) Psychological Operations: During the reporting period, the DISCOM Psychological Operations program continued to expand. Face to face communication is still the primary method of transmitting the PsyOp message, although ground and air loudspeakers and air leaflets drops were also used extensively. The composition of the Icap Team changed when, due to priority commitments, the military police security element was no longer able to accompany the team to the field. In order that the Icaps continue, the aid of local RF-PF personnel is now elicited. The RF-PF have provided satisfactory security for the Icap Team and the quality of the mission has not suffered. The Two Tigress Scouts who accompanied the Icap Team during the previous reporting period proved to be unsatisfactory and were dropped from the Icap Team. This does not reflect adversely on the Tigress Scout program but merely on the quality of the two specific individuals concerned. Recently the team has expended much of its effort along the lines of countering VC propaganda, which has stated that the 9th Division has been defeated.

b. Civil Affairs: Key, high impact projects completed during this reporting period include a bunker, school, boat dock, school house floor, market place, pagoda roof, foot bridge, school roof, and light vehicle bridge. Projects currently in progress include the construction of a school house, 4 PF Compounds, a PF housing area and the repair of a T. ward, cistern market place and light vehicle bridge. In addition to these and other projects DISCOM has aided in the repair of 11 individual dwellings, 18,410 patients were treated during the reporting period through the medics of ICAPS/DCAPS in the Cho Gao and Hoa Dong Districts and the daily MEDCAP at the DISCOM Civic Action Center. 10,200 of these patients were treated during June. This was the most productive month in the history of the DISCOM MEDCAP/ICAP operation. The MEDCAP is still the most effective way of eliciting a favorable response from the people. Civic Action Projects such as the construction of a school or market place are also favorably received and offer an occasion to involve the local populace in Community Action and thereby strengthen their ties with the GVN and their local officials. The DISCOM Elementary School enjoys continued success with the enrollment leveling off at 100 students. These children are soon to be transferred to a new school house recently completed by DISCOM. Support Command continues to improve good relations by close cooperation between DISCOM, Province personnel, R.D. Cadre, local hamlet, village and district chiefs and US advisory personnel. The MEDCAP/ICAP/RIGHTCAP program in the Go Con and Cho Gao areas has served to strengthen the growing influence of the GVN and is especially valuable in light of the 9th Division redeployment.

5. (U) Logistics:

a. On 8 May 69, 159 tons of supplies and equipment were delivered to Hoc Hoa in support of the 3rd Battalion, 39th Infantry. (20) C-123 sorties, (8) C-119 sorties, (19) CH-47 sorties and (3) C-7 sorties were used for the move. The unit was provided at least (2) hot meals a day and Class A rations were included in the initial move to Hoc Hoa.

b. On 16 May, arrangements were made for airlift of 97,000 lbs of Class V from Hoc Hoa to Binh Duc for the 3/39th Infantry. The Class V was moved by (10) C-123 sorties. The unit equipment and support elements were moved by CH-47's and C-123's.

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AVDE-SP-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) for Period Ending 30 June 1969. RCS/USFOR-65 (A-1) (U)

20 July 1969

c. On 7 May, the trailer-on-ship concept for moving heavy timber for construction and large quantities of supplies for FSFE Danger was initiated. A low bed trailer with 20-30 tons is loaded quickly aboard an LCR-8 at Dong Tam and met at My Thuan by a tractor which pulls the trailer off and moves it up QL4 to the construction site. An empty trailer is returned to Dong Tam.

d. On 20 May control of transportation of Local National employees to and from My Tho was begun. Prior to this over forty vehicles per day were used for this purpose. To date and after consolidation for control twenty-three 2½ ton trucks to transport almost 550 Local National employees have been issued permits. This control significantly reduces accident exposure.

e. On 12 June arrangements were made with 1st Log Command to provide shipment of unaccompanied baggage. The Personnel Property Branch established a new office with more space and with a new capability of processing 165 people a day with reserve capability of 300 with 4 days notice. Two carriers are supporting the 9th Division in their move.

f. Post Exchange Sales

(1) The volume of Retail Sales during the reporting period was as follows:

| | <u>DONG TAM</u> | <u>T. N. AN</u> |
|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|
| 1-31 May | \$ 629,599.93 | \$ 125,377.18 |
| 1-30 June | <u>556,674.91</u> | <u>140,467.41</u> |
| TOTAL | \$ 1,186,274.84 | \$ 265,844.59 |

(2) The volume of Concessions Sales and Services for the reporting period was as follows:

| | | |
|-----------|-------------------|------------------|
| 1-31 May | \$ 337,444.65 | \$ 23,793.45 |
| 1-30 June | <u>304,520.62</u> | <u>29,192.30</u> |
| TOTAL | \$ 641,965.27 | \$ 52,985.75 |

(3) The volume of Class VI Sales for the reporting period was as follows:

| | | |
|-----------|-------------------|------------------|
| 1-31 May | \$ 362,173.04 | \$ 75,997.30 |
| 1-30 June | <u>294,383.63</u> | <u>70,946.00</u> |
| TOTAL | \$ 656,556.67 | \$ 146,943.30 |

(4) The volume of Food Service Sales for the reporting period was as follows:

| | | |
|-----------|------------------|------------|
| 1-31 May | \$ 25,001.50 | \$ -0- |
| 1-30 June | <u>25,388.20</u> | <u>-0-</u> |
| TOTAL | \$ 50,390.10 | \$ -0- |

(5) The volume of Total Sales for the reporting period was as follows:

| | | |
|-----------|---------------------|-------------------|
| 1-31 May | \$ 1,354,219.52 | \$ 225,167.93 |
| 1-30 June | <u>1,180,567.36</u> | <u>240,605.71</u> |
| TOTAL | \$ 2,535,186.88 | \$ 465,773.64 |

g. Due to the redeployment of the Division, a large increase in the sale of luggage has been experienced. This increase is expected to extend to all exchanges in areas where troops will be redeploying.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DDP DIB 520.10

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AVDE-SP-C

20 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) for Period Ending
30 June 1969. RCS/CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

SECTION II: Lessons Learned, Commander's Observation, Evaluation and
Recommendations (See Inclosures 4, 5, 6, and 7).

- 1. (U) Personnel: None
- 2. (U) Training: None
- 3. (U) Operations: None
- 4. (U) Intelligence: None
- 5. (U) Logistics: None
- 6. (U) Organization: None
- 7. (U) Other: None

A. P. Hanket

A.P. HANKET
COL, CE
Commanding


- 7 Incl
- 1. Organizational Structure
- 2. Roster of Key Personnel
- 3. Location of Units
- 4. ORLE- 9th S&T Battalion
- 5. ORLE- 9th Medical Battalion
- 6. ORLE- 709th Maintenance Battalion
- 7. ORLL- 9th Administration Company

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF SUPPORT CO COMMAND



Inclusive 1 to Support Co Command OLLI for quarterly period ending 30 June 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL
BEGINNING AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5800.10

CONFIDENTIAL

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND 1 May 69 - 30 Jun 69





| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>POSITION</u> | | <u>RANK</u> | <u>DATE ASC</u> |
|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Hq Support Command | Commanding Officer | Hanket, Arthur P. | COL | 16Nov68 |
| Hq Support Command | Executive Officer | Williams, Davant T. | LTC | 10Jul69 |
| Hq Support Command | S-1 | Catalano, Daniel J. | MAJ | 12May69 |
| Hq Support Command | S-2/5 | Founder, Dennis J. | MAJ | 28Aug68 |
| Hq Support Command | S-3 | Gaglioti, John W. | MAJ | 25May69 |
| Hq Support Command | S-3 (Plans) | Gragson, Gary K. | LT | 6Mar69 |
| Hq Support Command | S-4 | Woeber, Donald H. | MAJ | 27Jan69 |
| Hq Support Command | DTO | Conway, Peter | MAJ | 3Jul69 |
| Hq Support Command | DAO | Taylor, Robert G. | MAJ | 17Nov68 |
| 9th Admin Co. | Commanding Officer | Thompson, Donald | MAJ | 2Jun69 |
| Reliable Academy | Dep Cndt | Kimerling, Roy D. | MAJ | 2Jul69 |
| HHC & Band | Commanding Officer | Paine, John H. | CPT | 23Apr69 |
| Hq Support Command | Chaplain | Lombardi, Felix J. | CPT | 15Jun69 |
| Hq Support Command | CSM | Sturtz, William L. | CSM | 10Oct68 |

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 13 YEARS
EOD 018 5200 10

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Inclosure #2 to Support Command ORLL for quarterly period ending 30 June 1969

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Enclosure 3 to Support Command ORLI for quarterly period ending 30 June 1969.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR SMC010

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 9TH SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96370

AVDE-ST

17 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operation Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 June
1969 (RCS/CSFOR-65) (R-1)

Commanding Officer
Division Support Command
9th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96370

SECTION I Significant Organization/Unit Activities

1. (C) Introduction:

a. The mission of the 9th Supply and Transport Battalion is:

(1) To support the division and attached units by providing Class I, II, III, IV and VII supplies (except medical supplies, repair parts, and aircraft parts and supplies), collection and evacuation of remains, collection and evacuation of unservicable equipment, limited bath service and map supply service.

(2) To provide and operate ground transportation for unit distribution of Class I, II, III, IV and VII supplies and to supplement transportation means to other units of the division.

(3) To maintain and transport the division reserve of supplies for which the unit is responsible.

(4) To command the 1097th Transportation Company and to provide administrative and logistical support, less marine maintenance support, to this unit.

b. The battalion has additional requirements to:

(1) Provide helicopter refueling and rearming facilities in support of brigade and smaller unit airmobile operations.

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DOWNGRADED AT THREE YEAR
INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER
TWELVE YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~SECRET~~

(2) Provide retail distribution of Class III products at DONG TAM BASE.

(3) Provide water delivery service on a 24 hour schedule to base units not having organic water transportation assets.

(4) Provide limited rough terrain forklift service to units within DONG TAM BASE.

c. Significant combat operation support during this period was:

(1) Operation TON THANG (Phase II) with 3rd Brigade.

(2) Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS with 1st and 2nd Brigade.

d. A roster of key personnel is attached at Inclosure 1.

2. (C) Organization:

a. The 9th Supply and Transport Battalion (See Inclosures 2a thru 2e) has its base camp located at DONG TAM BASE (XS 4143), currently has a forward support element (FSE) deployed in support of the division's 3rd Brigade based at TAN AN (XS 5565) and had a section aboard an LST with the Mobile Riverine Base (MRB) through this reporting period.

b. The Supply and Transport Battalion consists of three organic companies and one attached transportation company as follows:

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Company which provides personnel for command and control of the battalion. It includes the battalion staff and the Division Supply Office. Operationally, the Division Supply Office is the technical supply operations center of the battalion. The section is organized along commodity lines and includes the Ordnance Engineer, Quartermaster, Signal, Class I, Class III officers and the Division Food Service Technician. Material release expeditors at LONG BINH and VUNG TAU maintain liaison with the depots, coordinate transportation requirements, and expedite release and shipment of priority supplies to the Division Supply Office and the MRB.

(2) The Transportation Motor Transport Company which furnishes the necessary vehicular transportation to provide unit distribution of Class I, II, III, IV and VII commodities for which the 9th Supply and Transportation Battalion is responsible. The unit has organic 2½ ton trucks, 5-ton stake and platform semi-trailers, 5,000 gallon petroleum semi-tankers, and 1,200 gallon tank trucks.

(3) The Supply and Service Company which operates the battalion supply points, provides graves registration service, limited bath

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b. The Battalion Staff Sections continued to conduct team visits to subordinate units to insure that proper standards of the overall personnel administration effort was maintained. There was one major inspection conducted by higher headquarters (see para 4 below) during this reporting period.

c. The organization of an aerial delivery and resupply section (as mentioned in last ORLL Report) was operationally evaluated during the reporting period; particularly noteworthy was the approximate 40% improvement in supply responsiveness for all classes of supply when this section was used. This was possible because the aerial delivery and resupply section would rig and proposition loads.

d. The following key personnel changes have been effected since the last reporting period: (see inclosure 1).

4. (C) Logistics Supply

a. All major construction projects for Class I facilities at TAN AN (as mentioned in last ORLL report) have been completed with the exception of bunker construction which is being accomplished.

b. The Battalion's operations for this period involved an increase in the receipt, storage and/or issue of Class I, II, III, IV and VII supplies. This is attributed to the additional support provided the 3rd Battalion of the 199th Infantry Brigade which was attached to the 9th Division about 1 June.

c. (U) Services: No major change from last report.

d. The Class I Supply Point at TAN AN was completely inventoried, excesses were turned in, assets were stored properly and a stock location system was established.

e. The Class I, II & IV, III, and VII supply points at DONG TAN were rewarehoused.

f. Transportation: The availability of all types of Transportation attained a very high level due to the aggressive preventive maintenance program implemented during the reporting period.

g. (U) A Battalion CMI inspection was conducted by the 9th Division team on 2 May 1969. Results of this inspection were unsatisfactory. A re-inspection was conducted on 27 June 1969 with satisfactory results.

5. (U) Training: All mandatory training was performed as required by 9th Inf Div training directive.

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[REDACTED]

SECTION II (3) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

1. Supply:

a. The principal problem associated with supply is the prolonged actual order and shipping time (OST). The 30 day OST authorized for Requisitioning Objective computations is grossly inadequate. The actual OST has an adverse impact on the status of zero balances and demand satisfaction. The OST appears to constitute a fertile field for analysis. Essentially the S&T Battalion Material Release Expeditors at the depot deserve considerable credit for keeping the division supplied.

b. A second problem concerns the need for timely disposition instructions for serviceable excesses. Delayed disposition instructions cause storage problems at the DSU and, in many cases, deny a customer an item that is available in theater. In addition, a lack of timeliness tends to reduce the desire to declare excesses.

2. POL:

a. There are no major problems involving POL supply.

b. The destruction of storage tanks at the local Class III Distribution Point necessitated practically full reliance on 10,000 gal. collapsible tanks. The limited storage capacity requires very intensive management of JF4 and close liaison with the supply source. This situation demands that the supply source be able to respond immediately by road or water to satisfy requirements.

3. Food:

a. Food is probably the best managed commodity in the theater.

b. The supply source does an outstanding job in supplying food. The areas for improvement primarily involve inadequate refrigeration for units and the unreliable performance of contractors who deliver ice. Ice is a big item in this theater. The division's requirements are about 72,000 lbs. per day. The local ice plant only produces 24,000 lbs. per day which requires contractual deliveries. The erratic performance of these contractors has caused problems.

c. The six gallon size containers of milk are not sufficiently durable. Frequently these containers do not withstand rough handling which results in losses. These containers should be more durable.

d. Ice cream is provided effectively which enhances morale. However, 1 gal. containers must be made available for issues to units operating away from base camps. Action has been initiated to obtain 1 gal. containers.

4. Services:

a. Graves Registration (GR) Service: This area is extremely sensitive. The training of GR personnel must be of highest quality. Improper identification of remains and the loss of his personal property may be (are occasionally) a bases for adverse citizen and congressional correspondence which is embarrassing to the army and causes unnecessary grief for the family.

b. Bath Services: This battalion is authorized 9 bath units to support the division. Generally, 3 have been on requisition for a considerable period. An effort should be made to provide this type of equipment that is closely associated with health and sanitation on a more timely bases.

c. Retrograde of Salvage Service: A combat division generates considerable unserviceable, uneconomical items and salvage. The overall system must provide for timely turn-in of this volume. Although recent improvements have been initiated by Saigon Support Command to improve the procedure for turn-in, this area must receive considerable attention. The supporting Collection, Classification and Salvage Company must be made to accept items without the satisfaction of every "minute text book" requirement completely fulfilled.

5. Recommend that the following areas be further investigated to enhance support:

a. The actual order and shipping time is too long and efforts should be made to reduce it (e.g. more throughput, less manual processing of documents, increase order and shipping time period in the Requisitioning Objective to better align it with actual time).

b. The providing of disposition instructions for serviceable excess is not timely. Efforts should be made to provide these instructions more expeditiously. Disposition instructions for excesses reported in March have not been received.

c. There is a need to increase the reliability of contracted deliveries (e. g. ice).

d. There is a need to streamline the procedure used by the Collection, Classification and Salvage Company for receiving items.

e. There is a need to improve the supply responsiveness of forklifts and related repair parts. Logistics units generally are not authorized sufficient forklifts to cope with increased containerization; invariably, these units are short forklifts and have an inordinate number down for parts.

6. Recommend that the following candidate changes in doctrine and organization be reviewed by USACM and OCSFOR, DA:

a. The S&T Battalion should be responsible for operating rear points for helicopters. At the present time, this battalion is operating from 2 - 4 rear points. This is an important mission which is not addressed in the TOE. Logically, a helicopter rear point should be collocated with the helicopter refuel point which the S&T Battalion operates; consequently, the mission should be assigned to the S&T Battalion and appropriate doctrinal changes should be made to FM's. A minimum of eight qualified Class V personnel should be assigned to a proposed Class V Rearm Section that should be added to the TOE of the Supply and Service Company, possibly as a war time augmentation.

b. There is an urgent need to provide a command and control capability for the S&T Battalion's forward support elements that are deployed in the brigade train's areas as part of the DISCOM brigade support package (i.e. medical company, maintenance company and the S&T Battalion forward support element - FSE). The medical and maintenance company have unit commanders but the FSE, which consists of Class I, III, Graves Registration, bath and rearm personnel, is headed up by an E7. This does not provide for proper command and control of the varied supply and service functions performed in the brigade area. In addition, the E7 frequently experiences difficulty in coordination with the brigade S4 (Major) because both are busy and there is an appreciable difference in grade. Although the USA Combat Development Command (USACDC) has addressed this problem to some extent, a fresh look appears to be necessary. Recommend that consideration be given to reorganizing the Supply and Service Company as follows: retain the supply platoon with Classes I, II and IV, and III sections to operate distribution points in the division service area; reorganize the forward supply sections, GR section and bath section into three separate forward support platoons with a Lieutenant as a platoon leader and an E7 as a platoon sergeant; add a Class V rearm capability to each newly constituted forward support platoon; each of these platoons would be trained and deployed as a platoon size unit to support a brigade and would include the above supply and service capabilities. This would provide improved command and control of the S&T Battalion's elements that operate in the brigade areas.

3. The Forward Area Refueling Systems (FARFS) should be type classified Standard A and authorized the S&F Battalion to permit proper operation of refuel points for helicopters. 100 of this item were type classified Limited Production in January 1968 with 100 for USAF and 5 for an evaluation in COMUSMACV by TBCOM. A recent USAFV ACTIV report was favorable. DA (ACBFCR) initiated action in April 1969 to have USAMC accomplish necessary modifications and USACDC to prepare an Army-wide Bases of Issue Plan to expedite Standard A type classification. FY 69 and FY 70 budgets included the FARFS as a budget line item.

6 Incl
as

Ernest A. Vuley Jr.
ERNEST A. VULEY JR.
LTC, GMC
Commanding

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

Key Command and Staff Personnel

| NAME | RANK | POSITION | DATE ASSIGNED |
|------------------------|------|------------|---------------|
| Ernest A. Vuley Jr | LTC | Bn CO | 24 May 69 |
| John M. Dunham | MAJ | Bn XO | 15 May 69 |
| Marvlyn Wilde | MAJ | ADSUFO | 21 Jan 69 |
| Thomas E. Karlovetz | CPT | S-1 | 28 Apr 69 |
| Sherman I. Mays | CPT | S-2/3 | 15 May 69 |
| Eugene Y. Nakada | CPT | S-4 | 26 Feb 69 |
| John A. Ciano | CPT | CO, HHC | 31 Jan 69 |
| Henry J. Wojciechowski | CPT | CO, A Co | 5 Jun 69 |
| Peter D. Duncan | LLT | CO, B Co | 28 Jun 69 |
| John Henry | CPT | CO, 1097th | 1 Feb 69 |

Key Enlisted Personnel

| | MOS | AUTH |
|---------------|-------|------|
| Bn SGM | 76Z50 | SGM |
| Engr Sup Sgt | 76Q40 | SFC |
| Ord Sup Sgt | 76S40 | SFC |
| Div Sup Chief | 76Z50 | MSG |
| QM Sec Chief | 76Z50 | MSG |
| POL Sup Sgt | 76W40 | SFC |
| Sig Sup Sgt | 76U40 | SFC |
| Chief Sup NCO | 76Z50 | SFC |
| S-4 Sgt | 76Y40 | SFC |
| Per Staff NCO | 71H40 | SFC |

Incl 1

9TH SUPPLY and
TRANSPORT BATTALION

Auth O - 31
W - 3
E - 697

Asg O - 36
W - 6
E - 673

HQ & HQ COMPANY

Auth O - 15
W - 1
E - 69

Asgn O - 19
W - 1
E - 96

Auth under MTOE 29-6G
Jan 1968

A COMPANY
(SUP & SVC CO)

Auth O - 6
W - 0
E - 170

Asgn O - 7
W - 0
E - 161

Auth under MTOE 10-7G
Jan 1968

B COMPANY
(Transportation Motor
Transport Co)

Auth O - 5
W - 1
E - 218

Asgn O - 5
W - 1
E - 185


Auth under MTOE 55-88G
Jan 1968

1097th MEDICAL
POST COMPANY


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
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


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Enclosure 04



Incl 2e

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 9TH MEDICAL BATTALION 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96370

AVDE-SM-T

25 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
(RCS/CSPOR - 65) (R-1) (U)

Commanding Officer
Support Command, 9th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDE-SP-C
APO 96370

Section 1: Significant Organizational/Unit Activities

1. (U) Introduction:

a. The mission of the 9th Medical Battalion is to provide division level medical service to all divisional elements of the 9th Infantry Division; to provide unit level medical service on an area basis for all elements of the 9th Infantry Division having no organic medical capabilities; to provide medical supply and medical equipment maintenance to all medical units within the 9th Infantry Division; and provide dental, optometry, and limited psychiatric service.

b. During this period, the following combat operations were supported by the 9th Medical Battalion:

- (1) Speedy Express
- (2) Rice Farmer
- (3) Quyot Thang
- (4) Toan Thang III

c. There have been no major organizational changes within the 9th Medical Battalion. Both elective and mandatory training activities were conducted by all 9th Medical Battalion units concurrently with daily combat service support activities and are discussed in detail in paragraph 5 below. During the reporting period, there were two re-deployments conducted by Delta Company of the 9th Medical Battalion.

2. (C) Organization:

a. The 9th Medical Battalion is organized under MTOE 8-35G, PAC 1-68 and MTOE 8-37, PAC 1-68. Referenced Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment were implemented by General Order Number 775, Hq, USARPAC, dated 22 November 1968.

b. Headquarters, 9th Medical Battalion is located at Dong Tam Base (XS 4143) and provides planning and command/control of all medical service and medical support activities of 9th Medical Battalion units in the 9th Infantry Division Tactical Area of Interest. Company A is

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Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
(RCS/CSFOR - 65) (R-1) (U) (Cont) 25 July 1969

located at Dong Tam Base (XS 4143) and provides division level medical support to Division Main and Dong Tam Base. During the quarter Company A provided support to the 1st and 2nd Brigade on Operation Speedy Express, Rice Farmer, and Quyet Thang in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces. Company B is located at Dong Tam Base (XS 4143) and FSPB Moore (XS 2650). Company B provides medical support to the 1st Brigade in Dinh Tuong Province by providing selected medical personnel to Company A Clearing Station and with a Medical Reaction Team located at FSPB Moore (XS 2650). Company B is also undertaking critical base development activities which are discussed in paragraph 7 below. Company C is located at Tan An (XS 5465) and provides medical support to the 3rd Brigade on Operation Toan Thang (Phase III) in Long An Province. Company D has a clearing station aboard the USS Nueces, TF 117.2 and a treatment facility at Ben Tre Soccer Field (XS 5132) in support of the 2nd Brigade. The remainder of Company D is at Dong Tam Base (XS 4143).

c. Attached as Inclosure 1 is an organizational chart of the 9th Medical Battalion. Inclosure 2 is a complete listing of the 9th Medical Battalion Key Personnel. Inclosure 3 depicts 9th Medical Battalion Unit locations at the end of the reporting period.

3. (U) Personnel:

a. Personnel assignments to the 9th Medical Battalion increased during the period. At the end of the last quarter, the total enlisted strength was 312. At present, total enlisted strength is 337, which represents 101% of MTOE authorized strength.

b. There were eight casualties in the Battalion during the period. Three were wounded during a mortar attack on the base camp at Tan An, (XS 5465). One EM and the CSM were wounded during mortar attacks on the base camp at Dong Tam, (XS 4143) and three EM were wounded during sweep operations with the 1st Brigade.

c. Redeployment

(1) The 9th Medical Battalion was notified that it will redeploy to Hawaii minus Company C and Company D.

(2) Company C will remain at Tan An (XS 5465) in support of the 3rd Brigade.

(3) Company D will redeploy to CONUS for deactivation.

d. There were no significant personnel problems encountered during this period. Morale remains high throughout the Battalion.

4. (C) Operations

a. Headquarters, 9th Medical Battalion continued command and control of all division level medical service activities within the 9th Infantry Division Tactical Area of Interest. During the period the MEDCAP team continued to increase the number of operations. There were many 3 to 5 day operations. The MEDCAP team conducted 180 operations and treated 17,888 patients. The 137th Medical Detachment provided personnel to conduct DENTCAP missions. The DENTCAP team operated both with 9th Infantry

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(RCS/CSFOR - 65) (R-1) (U) (Cont) 25 July 1969

Division units and independently. During the period there were 24 MEDCAP operations with a total of 1,262 patients seen and 1,378 extractions in addition to normal dental care. In conjunction with the medical treatment of the Vietnamese populus, the 9th Medical Battalion continued to support two (2) schools, four (4) dispensaries, and two (2) orphanages. The MEDCAP team discovered another Vietnamese child with a cleft palate. With the aid of Vietnamese District and Provincial authorities the child was successfully operated on and after a recuperative period was returned home. In a continued effort to upgrade Vietnamese Medical personnel and train new medical personnel the 9th Medical Battalion trained four (4) Vietnamese civilians and three (3) nurses during this period. Some of this training was conducted in conjunction with MEDCAPs while the rest of the training was conducted in the dispensary. The MEDCAP team also distributed 10,000 pamphlets on Malaria, Plague, and dental care.

b. Company A, located at Dong Tam Base (XS 4143) provides medical support for Division Main, Dong Tam Base and 1st Brigade. The company also conducted MEDCAPs at Dong Tam Base gates. There were also four Vietnamese trained at the dispensary.

c. During this period, Company B was located at Dong Tam Base (XS 4143) and FSPB Moore (XS 2650). Company B was committed to medical support of the 1st Brigade by augmenting Headquarters and Company A Clearing Station, positioning specified personnel at FSPB Moore, and to base development at Dong Tam. On 1 June 1969, a medical reaction team was sent to FSPB Moore to provide medical support to 1st Brigade operations in Dinh Tuong Province. Company B provides ground ambulance support to the 3rd Surgical Hospital. Base Development included the assisting of Company C at Tan An in the construction of two barracks and an orderly room. Revetments were constructed around Medical Battalion billets and generator points.

d. Company C, which is located at Tan An (XS 6554), is in general support of the 3rd Brigade and attached units within the 3rd Brigade Area. Also Company C continues to operate MEDCAPs in the brigade area of operation. The construction of two barracks, an orderly room, and an eighty (80) man bunker was completed. Also 13 single-story buildings were removed.

e. During the reporting period Company D was located at Dong Tam Base (XS 4143), Ben Tre (XS 5131), and aboard the USS Hueces MRF. Company D was committed to medical support of 2nd Brigade and clearing stations aboard the USS Hueces and at Ben Tre. On 5 July 1969, the clearing station at Ben Tre was redeployed to Dong Tam. The clearing station on board the USS Hueces will redeploy in late July. Company D is also conducting an Immunization station at Reliable Academy for deploying troops.

5. (U) Training:

a. During the reporting period, all units of the 9th Medical Battalion continued to carry out the provisions of the 9th Medical Battalion Training Memorandum number 2-68, concurrently with routine combat service support activities. Both mandatory and elective training were accomplished. Special emphasis was placed on care and cleaning of small arms and ammunition, care and cleaning of TOE equipment and Command Information.

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Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
(RCS/CSFOR - 65) (R-1) (U) (Cont) 25 July 1969

b. All 9th Medical Battalion units, as in previous periods, continued cross-training programs in order to provide depth in key personnel slots.

6. (U) Logistics:

a. During the reporting period, no major difficulties were experienced in obtaining either Medical or General Supplies. Division Medical Supply maintains a 75 day supply level for the division and continues to supply all 9th Infantry Division Units.

b. A new warehouse is being constructed for Division Medical Supply at Tan An (XS 5465) and all Medical Supply functions will be shifted to Tan An upon redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division.

c. Prior to 10 June 1969, MEDCAP supply requests were being handled on a "Fill or Kill" basis in accordance with existing guidelines. These procedures did not meet the needs of the MEDCAP supply requirements. In order to meet the demands for MEDCAP supplies, all demands submitted for MEDCAP supplies during a 180 day period were picked up and the requisitioning objective was recomputed to increase the level of stockage for those items having a high MEDCAP demand. This procedure enables the DMSO to render due-out whereas before no due-out was given.

d. Although the order and ship time from the depot increased, the DMSO was able to maintain an average of 95% initial fill on recurring demands during the period.

7. (U) Base Development:

a. During the quarter two (2) two-story billets and an orderly room were completed and an eighty (80) man bunker was constructed. Rewetments were constructed around Headquarters and Company A and also Company B billets. Tin roofs were built on the bunkers. Drainage for the area was improved with the construction of more effective drainage ditches.

b. Area beautification was continued during the period.

Section 2 - Lessons Learned; Commanders Observation, Evaluations and Recommendation.

a. (U) Personnel:

Observation: Replacement personnel, especially in medical MOS's do not possess the requisite qualifications.

Evaluation: Experience has demonstrated that individuals with medical MOS's are being assigned with grade and MOS not commensurate with appropriate skill level.

Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969
(RCS/CSFOR - 65) (R-1) (U) (Cont) 25 July 1969

Action Taken: In an attempt to satisfy present and future needs, a comprehensive training program has been initiated with the assistance of Headquarters and Company A clearing station and the 3rd Surgical Hospital.

Recommendation: That this type of training program be continued.

- b. (U) Operations: None
- c. (U) Training: None
- d. (U) Intelligence: None
- e. (U) Logistics: None
- f. (U) Organization: None

Section 3: Not applicable to this Headquarters.


INCLOSURES:

- 1 - Organization
- 2 - Key Personnel
- 3 - Relative Unit Locations
- 4 - Monthly Essential Medical Data

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- 33 - CO, DISCOM, 9th Inf Div
- 2 - CG, 9th Inf Div ATTN: AVDE-MD

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DETLEF K. GOETTE
MAJ, MC
Commanding




ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION MEDICAL BATTALION
(INFANTRY DIVISION)

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
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Quarterly Period Ending 31 Jul 69
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
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
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
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
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
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Monthly Essential Medical Data

| | <u>May</u> | <u>June</u> | <u>July</u> |
|---------------------|------------|-------------|-------------|
| IRIA | 320 | 519 | 127 |
| NON-BATTLE INJURIES | 551 | 422 | 241 |
| OUT PATIENTS | 492 | 379 | 219 |
| IN PATIENTS | 59 | 43 | 22 |
| DISEASES | 4347 | 4384 | 2513 |
| OUT PATIENTS | 3981 | 4027 | 2237 |
| TOTAL | 6467 | 6139 | 3285 |

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 709TH MAINTENANCE BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96370

AVDE-SO-M

17 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1969 (UIC-WDF8AA) (U)

Commanding Officer
Division Support Command
9th Infantry Division
APO US Forces 96370

SECTION 1 Operations: Significant Activities

1. (C) Introduction

a. The mission of the 709th Maintenance Battalion is to provide direct support maintenance for all types of equipment in the Division except medical, cryptographic, electronic accounting machines, aircraft and Quartermaster air drop equipment. The Battalion provides organizational and DS level repair parts supply for supported equipment, and maintains a maintenance float of selected end items. It provides technical assistance to the Division and limited vehicular recovery.

b. Significant combat operations supported during this period were:

(1) Toan Thang III

(2) Quyet Thang

c. A roster of key personnel is attached as inclosure 2.

2. (C) Organization of the 709th Maintenance Battalion. (See Incl 1-3)

a. The 709th Maintenance Battalion (-), including Hq &

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Co A, is located with the Division Base at Dong Tam, RVN (XS4144). The forward support companies are located as follows: Company C at Dong Tam, supporting the 1st Brigade; Company E (-) at Dong Tam, supporting the 2nd Brigade; the Mobile Riverine Force Maintenance Detachment from Company E operated with the MRF until 7 July, when they were returned to Dong Tam for deactivation preparations; and Company D at Ben Luc (XS6375) supporting the 3rd Brigade. On 15 June 1968, the Transportation Aircraft Maintenance Company (Company B) was provisionally reorganized and attached to the 9th Aviation Battalion to test the decentralized aircraft maintenance concept. The test was extended indefinitely by 9th Infantry Division General Order #11119, dated 4 December 1968. However, Company B will be reattached to the Maintenance Battalion for redeployment.

b. Hq & Co A provides support for all Divisional elements not supported by the forward support companies, as well as the following nondivisional units: 29th Artillery, 518th Signal Detachment, and 335th Radio Research Company. It supplies repair parts and maintenance related supply support for the Division and all attached units, and maintains a maintenance float of selected items. A Materiel Readiness Expediter (MRE) Team and a Tractor Turn Around Point are maintained at the Long Binh Army Depot (YT0205).

c. The forward support companies are organized, equipped, and trained to operate in close support of the tactical elements of the Division. One forward support company is placed in support of each brigade.

3. (C) Personnel and Administration: During this period replacement personnel brought the assigned strength to 108% of the current authorization. However, the shortage of personnel in Army Career Groups 26 and 76 imposed severe hardships upon the Battalion and necessitated extensive on the job training programs conducted under less than desirable combat conditions. Personnel turbulence was created by the announced withdrawal of all 9th Infantry Division personnel except one brigade and its supporting elements. The immediate redeployment of many 709th Maintenance Battalion personnel who had completed 10 months of their tour vacated numerous key positions, thereby depriving elements of the battalion of critical personnel.

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31 July 1969 (UIC-WDF8AA) (U)

4. (C) Operations:

a. During the reporting period notification was received that the 709th Maintenance Battalion (-) would be redeployed to Hawaii. Preparations have been made to deactivate E Co, and leave D Co in Vietnam with the Support Battalion being formed as part of the 3rd Brigade. Transfer of the remainder of the support mission to the 1st LOG COMMAND was begun on 15 July, to be completed by 20 July. Preparations for redeployment have begun with inspections of equipment and loading. The Materiel Section has been given movement control responsibility.

b. The following maintenance accomplishments are reported:

| | <u>JOBS RECEIVED</u> | <u>JOBS COMPLETED*</u> |
|------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| Track Vehicles | 94 | 97 |
| Wheel Vehicles | 819 | 863 |
| Artillery & Mortars | 187 | 191 |
| Generators | 408 | 448 |
| Heavy Construction Equipment | 29 | 38 |
| Signal | 4509 | 4965 |
| Office Machines | 326 | 352 |

* Note: Includes open job orders at close of last period.

5. (U) Training:

a. Mandatory training was conducted as required by 9th Infantry Division Reg 350-3, and 9th DISCOM Training SOP. Training is conducted as the mission permits.

b. The 709th Maintenance Battalion received two allocations to the NCO Leadership Course, and one allocation to AN/PPS-5, DS/GS School. All allocations were filled by personnel from the Battalion.

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31 July 1969 (UIC-WDF8AA) (U)

6. (U) Logistics: Negative Report.
7. (C) Psychological Operations and Civic Actions: The present civic action program of the Battalion consists of giving aid to orphanages, schools, and ARVN units in the Ben Luc vicinity (XS6276). Company D, 709th Maintenance Battalion handles most of the aid, in the form of food, clothing, materials, and loan of equipment and operators.

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17 July 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1969 (UIC-WDF8AA) (U)

SECTION 2: Lessons Learned, Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

1. Personnel:

OBSERVATION: During this period, two of the Division's brigades and the Division base were given orders to redeploy to CONUS and Hawaii. The remaining brigade was given orders to remain in the Republic of Vietnam for further service and redesignation similar to a light infantry brigade.

EVALUATION: The accomplishment of the announced redeployment was seriously hampered by a lack of information concerning personnel who would definitely redeploy or who would remain in country. Effective planning was therefore hampered as hand receipt holders, advance parties, and various teams associated with the move could not be accurately determined. The most serious problem concerned the requirements to load equipment for shipment, without knowing what personnel were to redeploy with the unit. Some sections have been unable to load because the hand receipt holder will not redeploy and no one can be designated to inventory and sign for the equipment who will be present in Hawaii to receive and be responsible for it. This is making it very difficult to retain supply accountability and have the equipment loaded into the CONEX's in time for redeployment. Also, the many unsolved individual inquiries concerning redeployment status caused a marked decrease in the morale of all personnel, except those who received curtailments for subsequent reassignment to units moving to CONUS.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That future troop withdrawals be planned well in advance, and more timely decisions made as to composition of deploying units, so that personnel turbulence may be minimized, and redeployment planning may proceed in an orderly manner.

2. (C) Operations:

OBSERVATION: Under present FORSTAT procedures, units may be required to maintain unneeded and unwanted items.

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31 July 1969 (UIC-WDF844) (U)

17 July 1969

EVALUATION: At present, Commanders are required to keep and maintain all RICC-1 items, regardless of their necessity, solely to maintain a high REDCON. Many RICC-1 items not required in a particular location may be critical in another area of the command. Also, under the present system an organization may be very close to a C-2, but actually rated a C-3, because of a very few unneeded and unwanted items, e.g., cipher machines, and radiacmeters in a maintenance battalion.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Commanders be given some leeway in deciding which RICC-1 items are actually critical. They should not be penalized for not having equipment for which they have no use.

OBSERVATION: Upon receipt of redeployment instructions, a planning group was established at Dong Tam by USARV composed primarily of 1st Logistics Command personnel. In addition, 1st Log Command brought with them some fifty enlisted men, mostly inspection and classification personnel. These personnel were set up within one of the forward support companies of the Maintenance Battalion to assist with inspection and classification of the equipment being turned-in. Since one brigade was inactivated and a large quantity of the equipment of the redeployment units was directed to be left in USARV, this was a large mission.

EVALUATION: Although the 1st Log personnel worked within the existing command structure, they were not under its direct control. What developed was a dual chain of command that reached all the way down to the individual soldier working in the inspection point. This caused some problems for the Division, since 1st Log Command personnel did not, in all cases, follow Division policy. It caused more serious problems for the 1st Log personnel who were trying to accomplish their mission, since they did not have control over all personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: If similar conditions exist when the next divisional unit redeploys, it is recommended that the logistical support furnished the division for redeployment be attached to the division and integrated into its existing command and control structure. The 1st Log coordinating group

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31 July 1969 (UIC-WDF8AA) (U)

could be set up within the DISCOM Headquarters and the DISCOM XO given primary responsibility. Ideally, one of the forward support companies of the maintenance battalion should be relieved of its mission and that brigade's support picked up by the rest of the battalion and by 1st Log maintenance units. This company could then be augmented by a packing and preserving platoon, and given the responsibility for inspection and classification of equipment. Other 1st Log augmentation needed would be requested by the coordinating group in DISCOM Headquarters and attached directly to DISCOM units. Policies, directions, and requirements would then be passed through this group who would have the authority of the command chain. The only personnel who should not be attached to and thus under the control of the division would be a chief inspector for each commodity area, who would establish standards for equipment being turned-in through 1st Log channels.

- 3. (U) Intelligence: None
- 4. (U) Logistics: None
- 5. (U) Organization: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Charles C. Chase Jr.
 CHARLES C CHASE JR
 CPT OD
 Adjutant


- 3 Incl
- 1-Organization Chart
- 2-Roster of Key Personnel
- 3-Location of 709th Maintenance Battalion Units

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ORGANIZATION CHART OF 709TH MAINTENANCE BATTALION



INCLOSURE 1, Organization Chart of the Division Maintenance Battalion

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KEY COMMAND & STAFF PERSONNEL OF THE 709TH MAINTENANCE BATTALION

| <u>NAME</u> | <u>RANK</u> | <u>POSITION</u> | <u>DATE ASSIGNED</u> |
|---------------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------------------|
| 1. BENJAMIN B. ALBERT Jr. | LTC | BN CO | 3 November 1968 |
| 2. BRUCE S. PACKARD | MAJ | BN XO | 8 March 1969 |
| 3. JOHN C. SPELDIE | MAJ | MAF OFF | 16 October 1968 |
| 4. CHARLES C. CHASE Jr. | CPT | S-1 | 4 December 1968 |
| 5. DONALD C. JONASSON | 1LT | S2/3 | 10 November 1968 |
| 6. ROBIN B. HEATH | CPT | S-4 | 26 March 1968 |

INCLOSURE 2, Roster of Key Personnel of
709th Maintenance Battalion



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LOCATION OF 709TH MAINTENANCE BATTALION UNITS

BIEN HOA



Reference: Map, Vietnam
Series L7014, 1:50,000

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INCLOSURE 3, Location of 709th Maintenance Battalion Units.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
9TH ADMINISTRATION COMPANY, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96370

AVDE-SA

18 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORLL) for period
ending 30 June 1969

Commanding Officer
Support Command
9th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDE-SP-C
APO San Francisco 96370

1. (U) Introduction: This unit serves as a carrier unit which provides support elements of the special staff. During the reporting period this unit provided administrative and logistical support to those personnel providing combat service support to the Division. This unit also provided a portion of the static perimeter security force.
2. (U) Organizational Structure:
 - a. The organizational structure is graphically portrayed in the organization diagram (Inclosure 1). As the diagram indicates, operational control of most personnel lies with the special staff officers of the Division and not the company commander. Elements depicted on the bottom row of the organizational diagram are attached to other units for rations, quarters and administration. No organization changes occurred during this reporting period.
 - b. Key personnel: A roster of key personnel for company headquarters is inclosed (Inclosure 2).
3. (U) Personnel and Administration:
 - a. Unit strength: Officer and Warrant Officer strength remained constant. Enlisted strength remained relatively constant with considerable overstrength by 491 men in excess of 355 men based on TOE 12-37G.
 - b. Morale and discipline: Morale remained high. There were no court-martial convictions during this period.
4. Intelligence (omitted).
5. (U) Operations:
 - a. The extent to which Admin Co personnel were involved in operations were limited to perimeter defense and passive defense measures against enemy

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AVDE-SA

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORLL) for period ending 30 June 1969

mortar attacks during this reporting period.

b. There were numerous mortar attacks by hostile fires, inflicting 1 KIA and 11 WIA's

6. (U) Training: Training consisted of classes on mandatory and special interest subjects. Additional driver training and supply economy classroom sessions were also conducted.
7. (U) Logistics: Normal activity was experienced with turn-in and issuance of supplies and equipment.
8. (U) Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs: This company contributed to the local civic action program, four teachers to instruct English classes at My Tho.
9. (U) Regional Force/Popular Force Upgrading and ARVN Training: (omitted).
10. Engineer Support: (omitted).
11. Signal Support: (omitted).
12. Army Aviations: (omitted).
13. Chemical Operations: (omitted).
14. Base Development: (omitted).

Section 2 Commanders Observations and Recommendations

1. (C) Observations:

a. During mortar attacks a good percentage of personnel did not take advantage of protective bunkers. Many slept through an attack. Corrective action initiated to hold billets commanders (NCO's) responsible to awaken all personnel under his command.

b. Reactionary Forces were eager to participate in an actual attack but were reluctant to form during yellow or orange alerts. Rehearsals were held to emphasize the urgency, and immediate response desired by the force on call.

3. Recommendations: None

2 Incl
as

Donald J Thompson
DONALD THOMPSON
MAJ INF
Commanding

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR
INTERVALS DECLASSIF-
IED AFTER 12 YRS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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